University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

UMKC School of Law Institutional Repository
Faculty Works

Faculty Scholarship

2019

Discrimination by Design?
Naomi Cahn
June Carbone
Nancy Levit
University of Missouri - Kansas City, School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://irlaw.umkc.edu/faculty_works
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Discrimination by Design?, 51 Arizona State Law Journal 1
(2019).
Available at: https://irlaw.umkc.edu/faculty_works/321

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UMKC School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of
UMKC School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact shatfield@umkc.edu.

DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN?
Naomi Cahn,* June Carbone** & Nancy Levit***
ABSTRACT
Platform world is speeding the redesign of employment. Bricks-andmortar firms once hired through narrow portals and then invested in the
workers they hired, providing job security and predictable career ladders.
Platform world flings the doors wide open to income-generating efforts,
providing new opportunities but also offering security and predictable
advancement to almost no one.
Other legal scholars have mined these same data for gender disparities;
they have found disparities in the platform economy arising from customer
biases and individual preferences, and manifested in men’s and women’s
different experiences in everything from pricing plumbing services to fraud
prevention. Neutral-appearing algorithms may then amplify the impact on
wages and opportunities. Because the outcomes are not equal, other scholars
argue that these disparities should be actionable. Accordingly, they suggest
various ways to adapt existing laws to remedy gender disparities.
This Article is the first to develop an analysis of the multiple types of
gender disparities in platform world. Rather than focus on the fact that
disparities exist, this Article asks the question when—and even more
provocatively, whether—they should matter.
First, the Article documents the various sources and forms of gender
disparities, setting up the argument that no one legal approach fits. Second,
while some of those disparities are already actionable under existing
antidiscrimination laws, even antidiscrimination law today rarely provides a
viable cause of action simply because the results produce statistical
disparities. In platform world, it’s not clear that the disparities are morally
questionable, actionable under existing law, or appropriate subjects for
regulation. The real issues in this new economy concern the lack of benefits,
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stability, and promotion opportunities. Antidiscrimination law can help those
employed by platform companies, but not the gig workers who need health
benefits and protection against harassment, nor the algorithms that need
oversight. Consequently, existing antidiscrimination law is all but irrelevant
except to address the most glaring discrepancies, and the real need is for a
wholesale rethinking of the legal infrastructure necessary to realize the
benefits of the platform economy for more than a few platform creators.
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INTRODUCTION
We increasingly live our lives in a digital world, buying textbooks,
groceries, and travel on internet platforms, offering our own services as
drivers or organizers or lawyers in the gig economy, and looking for
professional connections and dating options on the Web. Computer programs
oversee the transactions. They link parties in accordance with their
preferences—whether for the cheapest e-reader or the right intimate partner.
The popular and legal assumption has been that these transactions are
impersonal, autonomous, and efficient. Anyone can offer items for sale
online; anyone can apply to become a ride-share driver. Customers rate based
on quality of service. Computer algorithms implement whatever selection
criteria coders write into their programs; the programs exercise no discretion,
and thus they cannot discriminate. They can hardly act on the basis of bias,
given that they are not conscious at all. Yet, the evidence is mounting that the
new platform world reflects—and often exacerbates—gender disparities. The
question this Article addresses is when do the disparities matter?
Consider the following examples.
On Platform Alpha, when gig workers bid for jobs, women offer lower
prices than comparably qualified men. Customers choose the more expensive
men for physical labor, such as moving furniture, and the less expensive
women for other work, such as organizing clutter.
Platform Beta allows its users to customize message delivery. Customer
C uses data gleaned from online profiles, browser usage, and social media
usage to target employment ads to those most likely to demonstrate interest
in such positions and to meet its selection criteria. As a result, ads for
executive positions go overwhelmingly to men, and jobs in teaching and
health care overwhelmingly to women.1
Platform Gamma, a ride-hailing company, creates a system that gives
bonuses for picking up customers between 11 p.m. and 3 a.m., but not
between 3 a.m. and 8 a.m. Male drivers disproportionately get the bonuses
1.
Facebook has been sued for allowing its advertisers to exclude women. See Noam
Scheiber, Facebook Accused of Allowing Bias Against Women in Job Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/business/economy/facebook-job-ads.html
[https://perma.cc/78CF-TX2Y]. In a settlement of multiple lawsuits, Facebook agreed to separate
out ads having to do with housing, credit, and employment and disallowing advertisers to target
by age, gender, or zip code for those categories. Janet Burns, Facebook Agrees to Prevent Some
Advertisers from Targeting by Race, Gender, Age, FORBES (May 19, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2019/03/19/facebook-agrees-to-prevent-someadvertisers-from-targeting-by-race-gender-age/#2df47b14636f. Moreover, it is more expensive
to advertise to women. See Lisa Spear, The STEM Gender Gap: Science Job Ads
Disproportionately Seen by Men, NEWSWEEK (July 26, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/stemgender-gap-science-job-ads-are-mostly-seen-men-1044401 [https://perma.cc/J6XQ-R9HB].
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because women have safety concerns about the type of customer likely to be
seeking a ride during those hours. The ride-hailing company offers two
explanations:
a) The shortage of drivers is greater between 11 and 3 than between
3 and 8, and the algorithm automatically adjusts by awarding higher
bonuses;
b) Initially, both time periods had a shortage of drivers, but small
bonuses corrected the problem between 3 and 8 while it took larger
bonuses to adjust the supply between 11 and 3, and once the larger
bonuses took hold, the percentage of men driving between 11 and 3
increased.

Platform Delta, which supplies home health aides, determines pricing
based on the ratings of its employees. Women get higher ratings than men.
An investigation reveals that:
a) Women seem to be rated higher without differences in
performance;
b) Women on average were rated higher because the customers
seemed to prefer women except when the patient was a male who
required physical assistance in which case the men were rated
higher.

Platform Zeta finds that its male employees are 10% more efficient than
its female employees and thus get higher bonuses. An investigation indicates
that:
a) Women spend more time on average responding to customer
complaints because they are more conscientious;
b) Women spend more time on average responding to customer
complaints because the customers ask them more questions and are
less satisfied with women’s responses, even though the company
gives men and women the same scripts for resolving such
complaints;
c) Women spend more time on average responding to customer
complaints because they care less about the bonuses.

Platform Epsilon hires software engineers to develop new products. It
recruits both men and women, but, after five years, its engineering and
management workforce is 80% male.
Gender disparities arise in each of these situations, and, to the extent that
companies use algorithms that reflect existing practices, they have the
potential to get worse. The source of those discrepancies varies: customer
ratings, algorithms, and gig worker preferences. Few, and perhaps none, of
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the examples above, give rise to actionable discrimination claims under
existing law, and reasonable people might differ as to whether the gender
disparities should be a source of concern, much less the subject of legal
sanctions.
Despite the lack of agreement—or perhaps because of it—there is growing
attention to the subject of disparities in the platform world. 2 Indeed, other
scholars have suggested various ways to adapt existing laws to address these
disparities in the platform world.3 To date, however, no scholar has analyzed
the full scope of these discrepancies and considered the ways that the
disparities are embedded not just in platform world’s algorithms, but in the
structure of the information economy itself.
That is one goal of this Article; we are the first to examine systematically
the different forms of gender disparities in the platform world that exist at the
levels of the companies themselves, the workers, customers, and algorithms.
Contrary to others, we question whether disparities equal discrimination—
and whether that discrimination is more egregious in platform world. Even if
some of the disparities in Platforms Alpha through Epsilon do result from
discrimination that might be actionable under existing laws, it’s not clear that
they are necessarily worse than the disparities and discrimination in the
traditional economy. Indeed, platform world may make it easier for women
to gain a foothold in traditionally male-dominated fields such as plumbing;
while the women may still be paid less, they often find it easier to be hired.
And not all of the disparities are discrimination by the platform itself; many
reflect the ways customer and worker preferences match up (although the
platforms can take some actions to mitigate the impact of these biased
preferences).
The more ambitious goal of this Article, then, is to reframe the discussion
of gender disparities in the platform economy to consider how they relate to
a substantive vision of equality. Employment discrimination law and cases
are overwhelmingly focused on the question of whether the targeted practices
are legally actionable discrimination. We think that this is the wrong question
in analyzing these gender disparities. The real problems are in the structure
2.
See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 671, 673–76 (2016); Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1024–27 (2016). See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The
New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271
(2017) (exploring potential legal remedies for race discrimination against participants in the
sharing economy, such as Airbnb hosts and Uber drivers).
We articulate the concept of “platform world” to include platform workers, platform practices,
and platform companies; we are not just focused on workplace issues. This Article does focus on
the producer side of the platform, but will discuss the consumer or buyer side in several places.
3.
E.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 2, at 727; Leong & Belzer, supra note 2, at 1317–22.
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of the platform economy itself. Antidiscrimination law sought to open the
door to the “good jobs” of the industrial economy to workers, such as women
and minorities, who had largely been excluded.4 The platform economy, in
contrast, throws the doors wide open to anyone who wishes to enter. Ease of
access—for those seeking to hire a grad student to write a term paper or for
a stay-at-home mom looking for part-time employment—is the hallmark of
the new economy. Moreover, this ease of access eliminates many of the
sources of “privilege” in the traditional economy. “Ideal workers” who can
work forty hours a week because of a spouse with primary responsibility for
the children, for example, may enjoy less of an advantage over a worker who
prefers to work twenty hours a week in bricks-and-mortar world. At the same
time, however, the platform economy may depress income more generally,
fail to provide the same degree of protection from lawbreaking or harassment,
and offer fewer benefits such as health insurance or paid family leave.
Accordingly, the Article analyzes these disparities in their larger legal
context and shows that the way forward for regulating the platform economy
does not always, or even necessarily, depend on traditional antidiscrimination
law at all. Instead, solutions to gender disparities involve other kinds of laws,
such as those relating to health insurance, wage and hour regulation, and
parental benefits.5
The Article first explores the jurisprudential challenges to, and of, equality
in the new platform world. Part II describes the promise of platform world
for ending discrimination and the realities of existing disparities. Instead of
reviewing cases, it analyzes the potential bases for any case—customer rating
systems, data mining design, corporate structure, self-bidding, and other
forms of predictive analytics—and it assesses whether disparities produced
by these mechanisms are intentional and controllable through existing
antidiscrimination law. Part III turns to the legal mechanisms that are
available to combat discrimination outside of the platform, showing how they
cannot address the various forms in which disparities appear in the different
elements that compose platform world. Part IV draws on this analysis to
address the difficulties in developing new laws to address gender disparities
in the platform world. The Article shows that the disparities are not
necessarily morally questionable, actionable under existing law, nor even
4.
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing
Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 432–33 (2018).
5.
We thus reject “cyber-exceptionalism,” the concept that the internet world is sui generis.
See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next
Internet Economy, 69 FLA. L. REV. 887, 954 (2017); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three
Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 45 (2013),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-three-paradoxes-of-big-data/
[https://perma.cc/W7V3-WKR4].
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appropriate subjects for regulation. Instead, the critical regulatory issues in
this new economy concern the lack of benefits, stability, and promotion
opportunities. Consequently, existing antidiscrimination law is all but
irrelevant except to address the most glaring discrepancies, and the real need
is for a wholesale rethinking of the legal infrastructure necessary to realize
the benefits of the platform economy for more than a few platform creators.
I.

THE CHALLENGE OF EQUALITY

Platform world promises to be part of a large-scale redesign of the
production of goods and services, producing a societal transformation on the
order of the industrial revolution. Digitally based platforms like Uber,
TaskRabbit, and Airbnb offer flexibility in hours and the ability to have armslength, impersonal, and often anonymous interactions that match the personal
preferences of buyers and sellers.6 A dramatic expansion in data mining
facilitates the creation of custom-tailored goods and services from
individualized tee shirts to affordable divorce settlements. And innovations
in gaming and entertainment may ultimately create not just new consoles, but
entirely new virtual worlds. The challenge in this new economy is to consider
what gender inequality means. If men and women have different preferences,
and these different preferences skew income, wealth, and entertainment
opportunities, the issue is whether an economy can and should be built on
these individual preferences that will inevitably produce disparities. This
section considers the underlying jurisprudential principles for developing a
legal hierarchy of disparities.
The hierarchy begins with an assumption that some disparities are
intrinsically offensive and should be treated as discrimination per se. Justice
Scalia, for example, while expressing skepticism about other aspects of
antidiscrimination law, thought Brown v. Board of Education was correctly
decided in its rejection of de jure segregation.7 Brown, in rejecting separate
but equal school systems, acknowledged that racially identified schools were
never truly equal in part because the process of categorization itself had
consequences that went beyond the immediate impact of measurable school
6.
E.g., Emily C. Atmore, Note, Killing the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg: Outdated
Employment Laws Are Destroying the Gig Economy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 887, 888 (2017); Alex
Kirven, Comment, Whose Gig Is It Anyway? Technological Change, Workplace Control and
Supervision, and Workers’ Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 249, 253 (2018); see
also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern
Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1718 (2016) (noting that the autonomy may “be more illusory
than first appearances suggest”).
7.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 87–88 (2012).
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disparities. The artificial intelligence context, in a parallel fashion, risks
creating racially and gender identified categories, with consequences, as the
Brown Court said, “that may affect . . . hearts and minds”8 of people who
inhabit platform world. For example, an algorithm that sends ads for
managerial positions exclusively to men and administrative assistant
positions exclusively to women, based on past applications or hiring patterns,
may not necessarily be designed with the intention of creating categories
based on identity characteristics, but once it does so, it almost always
involves intrinsically offensive practices that risk reinforcing the importance
of gender in path dependent ways.
The second principle identifies the tradeoffs that underlie disparities that
may not be offensive per se, that is, that appear neutral. Antidiscrimination
law initially sought to create equal access to secure jobs and the pathways to
promotion within them, regardless of gender and race. The second generation
of Title VII then considered whether practices, such as written exams for firefighting positions, that were not intrinsically objectionable, in fact
perpetuated racially identified workplaces. In platform world, where initial
access is much less of a barrier, gender disparities may be tied to second order
issues that are not explicitly gender-based but do have a disproportionate
impact on women, such as safety, risk taking, family responsibilities, or
response to competition. For example, one well-heralded study shows that
male Uber drivers make more money than female Uber drivers, in part,
because they drive faster.9 The question of whether this should be permissible
may not rest on the fact of gender differences per se. Instead, attention to
gender differences should be coupled with questions about whether Uber’s
reward of faster driving causes more accidents.
The third identifies the degree to which the process of designing new
platforms in itself imposes greater legal and moral responsibility for the
results. Consider, for example, a bricks-and-mortar company that routinely
finds that about 8% of the applicants for its high pressure, commission sales
force jobs are men. Suppose that the company decides it no longer needs to
employ its own sales employees but instead relies on a platform that recruits
workers to sell the products for the company as independent contractors. The
platform develops an algorithm based on studies finding that it gets the best
results in soliciting sales agents by targeting those who browse certain
hunting and video game sites. The platform ends up with an applicant pool
and then a sales force that is 90% male. Is the responsibility of the newly
8.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
9.
Cody Cook et al., The Gender Earnings Gap in the Gig Economy: Evidence from over
a Million Rideshare Drivers 30–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24732,
2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24732 [https://perma.cc/8836-P663].
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created platform different in any way from the bricks-and-mortar company
in that it is developing its recruitment techniques from scratch rather than
relying on traditional industry practices?10
The algorithms reflect the choices of their creators.11 The overarching and
concomitant philosophical inquiry, then, asks whether equality principles in
platform world are any different from those in bricks-and-mortar world,
reflecting the now longstanding dichotomy in cyberlaw between two
different approaches to regulation and exceptionalism. On the one hand,
platform creators often claim that they are simply matching supplier and
customer preferences, with no responsibility for the result. On the other hand,
the design process involves trying something new, testing the results, and
making adjustments. As a result, a creator who tests a design, discovers
gendered effects, and chooses not to adjust the platform acts far more
intentionally than the entrepreneur who establishes a new store that operates
like every other store of the same nature. In these cases, where disparities
arise and are perpetuated after they have become apparent, the result is not
the product of “implicit bias” of which the actor may not have even been
aware, but of conscious decision-making and purposeful endorsement of the
outcome.12 Customer ratings, for example, have become a distinctive aspect
of many platforms, replacing expert or supervisor evaluations of workers.
Yet, studies document racial and gender disparities that do not appear to
correlate with differences in service.13 Some but not all platforms creators
design their platforms to blunt the impact of biased ratings.14
These principles raise the questions, then, of when and how platform
creators take (and should take) gendered attributes into account. When Apple
created a voice for its digital assistant, Siri, it quite consciously considered
reactions to female rather than male voices in deciding on Siri’s default

10. Targeted job notices, ads, or postings leading to disparate impact would be at least
potentially actionable in both worlds. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in
Employment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1453 (2014); Julie Goldscheid,
Disparate Impact’s Impact: The Gender Violence Lens, 90 OR. L. REV. 33, 49 (2011).
11. “The architecture of cyberspace is neutral; it can enable or disable either kind of choice.”
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501,
522 (1999).
12. See Michael Selmi, Statistical Inequality and Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 216, 220 (2016) (challenging the distinctions between implicit
and explicit bias).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 57–105.
14. See Tobias Baer & Vishnu Kamalnath, Controlling Machine-Learning Algorithms and
Their Biases, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/risk/our-insights/controlling-machine-learning-algorithms-and-their-biases
[https://perma.cc/N4ZR-HZJD].
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tones.15 Siri, however, is not likely to gain standing to sue any time soon.
These guiding principles concerning responsibility for disparities frame this
Article’s approach to legal regulation of the platform world. This Article
considers the extent to which platform designers have a legal obligation to
take platform-external biases into account, and the degree to which the
designers are responsible for other factors, such as employee manipulation,
that may exacerbate the disparities.16 In short, does the art of creation confer
special obligations on the creators?
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLATFORM WORLD

While the platform economy is transforming the workplace, creating new
opportunities and businesses, its development is still grounded in the
contemporary market-based industrial economy; it is both novel and familiar.
To examine platform world, we first define what we mean by the term, and
then turn to consider how the lack of regulation shapes existing practices.
A. Defining Platform World
“Platform world” is the term we use to describe all of the different actors
involved in the increasing use of digital programs to match people with goods
and services they wish to exchange. The term includes both labor and capital
platforms,17 and all of those who participate, as customers, sellers, workers,
programmers, and funders.18 The term includes a variety of different types of
15. Ned Potter, Why Are Computer Voices Female? Ask Siri, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2011),
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/apples-siri-female-voice/story?id=14802733
[https://perma.cc/2BHF-QKV7].
16. See Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1108
(2017) (“Actionable discrimination requires merely that an adverse employment action be
‘because of’ a protected class.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012)).
17. “Labor platforms, such as Uber or TaskRabbit, and which are sometimes referred to as
the ‘gig economy,’ connect customers with freelance or contingent workers who perform discrete
tasks or projects. Capital platforms, such as Airbnb or eBay, connect customers with individuals
who lease assets or sell goods peer-to-peer.” DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JPMORGAN CHASE
& CO. INST., THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY: HAS GROWTH PEAKED? 3 (2016),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-online-platformecon-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M44-9ZQF]; see also AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., GIG
WORK,
ONLINE
SELLING
AND
HOME-SHARING
4–5
(Nov.
17,
2016),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2016/11/17161707/PI_2016.11.17
_Gig-Workers_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MMT-X25K].
18. Funders include traditional venture capital firms and crowd-sourced funding. E.g., Nick
Bunker, What Problem Does Crowdfunding Venture Capital Solve?, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE
GROWTH (Nov. 10, 2015), https://equitablegrowth.org/what-problem-does-crowdfunding-
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businesses as well.19 It thus encompasses those who are employed by
platform companies, and those who perform contingent work for such
companies,20 as well as those who buy, sell, or trade services and goods, and
the algorithms through which participants are matched.
This terminology differs from other scholars, who typically focus on only
one part of this new world. For example, some scholars concentrate on the
platform workplace, labeling income-generating opportunities such as those
on Uber or TaskRabbit as part of “the gig economy.”21 And, in fact, the
platform economy does expand the possibilities for such freelance workers
by creating more potential markets in which to sell their services as
chauffeurs, programmers, home organizers, gardeners, dog walkers—or
almost any other skill they possess. The problem with the word “gig,”
however, is that it is an amorphous concept that consists of anyone who
engages in independent work or works outside of the traditional employeremployee relationship.22 It thus includes not only those who participate in the
venture-capital-solve/ [https://perma.cc/9MYC-ATZM]. A separate set of issues raised by the
new age of technology, but not explored in this Article, centers on automation, another
manifestation of the information highway. That too will have an impact on jobs. See, e.g.,
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED: WORKFORCE TRANSITIONS IN A TIME OF
AUTOMATION 2 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/
future%20of%20organizations/what%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mean%20fo
r%20jobs%20skills%20and%20wages/mgi-jobs-lost-jobs-gained-report-december-6-2017.ashx
[https://perma.cc/9X9B-DXJK].
19. There are platforms for services, goods, real estate, investment, and lending, among
other categories. “Labor platforms, such as Uber or TaskRabbit, . . . connect customers with
freelance or contingent workers who perform discrete tasks or projects.” FARRELL & GREIG, supra
note 17, at 3; see also SMITH, supra note 17, at 4–5. eBay and Airbnb could be seen as “sales”
platforms. And there are other categories, as well, such as raising capital, through platforms like
Kickstarter.
20. See, e.g., Elisabeth Buchwald, The Government Has No Idea How Many Gig Workers
There Are, and That’s a Problem, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com
/story/the-government-has-no-idea-how-many-gig-workers-there-areheres-why-thats-aproblem-2018-07-18 [https://perma.cc/BTH9-CTUP].
21. E.g., Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust
Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2018) (“The proliferation of the so-called
‘sharing economy’ platforms in the past decade has given rise to a still small, but rapidly
increasing, gig economy workforce.”); Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of
Employment and Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51, 51 (2017).
22. There is no authoritative definition of the gig economy, although formulations center on
people making a living doing a series of patchwork freelance or contract jobs or “gigs,” rather
than a full-time job. See, e.g., Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of
Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015, 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22667, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22667
[https://perma.cc/BGQ5-G6RF]; Buchwald, supra note 20; What Is a Gig Worker?, GIG ECON.
DATA HUB (last visited Dec. 23, 2018), https://www.gigeconomydata.org/basics/what-gig-worker
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“sharing economy” and find work through internet platforms but also
agricultural workers who find seasonal gigs.23 Moreover, the “gig economy”
does not necessarily include those who generate income by selling goods—
or a combination of goods and services, such as those selling on Craigslist or
eBay, or hosting on Airbnb.
The platform economy, as a broader term, allows for such transactions that
might once have been available through retail stores or newspaper ads or flea
markets.24 “Platform economy” is thus a more useful term for this new sector
of the economy, which includes not only those gig workers who find jobs
through an internet platform, but also the companies that set up the internetbased possibilities for gig workers and, more broadly, that use the internet to
conduct their businesses. For example, Facebook is both a corporation with
thousands of employees and a social media system available to billions of
users; similarly, Uber has a traditional bricks-and-mortar company,
thousands of workers who are not employees, and millions of customers; and
Google offers an increasing number of economic and non-economic
transactions. In the process, these platforms may be blurring the line, if not
completely dissolving the distinctions between employees and independent
contractors, work and non-work, and social and commercial transactions.25
[https://perma.cc/2ZCH-Y6PD]; Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, U.S.
DEP’T
LAB.:
CAREER
OUTLOOK
(May
2016),
https://www.bls.gov/
careeroutlook/2016/article/what-is-the-gig-economy.htm [https://perma.cc/6S6T-FJAR]; Jane
Wells, Getting by in the “Gig Economy”: Part-Time Jobs That Pay, NBC NEWS (July 19, 2015,
4:47 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/careers/getting-gig-economy-part-time-jobs-payn390211 [https://perma.cc/AP7S-NPSJ]. It thus includes Uber drivers and construction workers.
23. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 136
(2017) (“Platforms—including online marketplaces, desktop and mobile computing
environments, social networks, virtual labor exchanges, payment systems, trading systems, and
many, many more—have become the sites of ever-increasing amounts of economic activity and
also of ever-increasing amounts of social and cultural activity.”). “Workers who provide services
through online intermediaries, such as Uber or Task Rabbit, accounted for 0.5 percent of all
workers in 2015. About twice as many workers selling goods or services directly to customers
reported finding customers through offline intermediaries than through online intermediaries.”
Katz & Krueger, supra note 22, at 1. There are even professors of internet geography. See Annie
Lowrey, What the Gig Economy Looks Like Around the World, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/gig-economy-global/522954/
[https://perma.cc/7QM7-6SJX].
24. “[C]onsumers are the clear winner[] . . . .” Lao, supra note 21, at 1586. Platforms are
not just the vehicles for economic transactions but for various forms of speech and ideas. See Kate
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1613 (2018). Platform companies create new markets; the artists on Etsy no
longer rely on street traffic in their local community but on internet traffic worldwide for sales of
their handcrafted products.
25. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
employees and independent contractors).
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It is clear that the size of the platform world will increase, with ever greater
numbers of people deriving income directly or indirectly from platform
transactions. In addition, algorithms increasingly order these transactions,
often with little human supervision as they perform more tasks in both the
public and private sectors.26 Even if these alternative ways of generating
income supplement rather than replace traditional employment, they are
likely to account for an increasing percentage of the overall economy. Today,
however, most platform participants do not rely on such activities as their
primary source of income.27 Indeed, almost a quarter of platform workers are
students.28 The question for the future, however, is whether this form of gig
jobs will increasingly define the parameters of employment relationships.
Using a more precise definition of platform world that includes the
different actors who use digital programs thus enables a more precise
understanding of the source and regulations of the numerous types of
disparities that exist.
B. Evading Norms, Standards, and Oversight
Regulatory issues are complicated by the nature of the platform world
itself. The emerging platforms are lightly regulated. Indeed, the core of the
new system is its ability to match individual preferences in a decentralized
fashion that circumvents the laws, large institutions, and customs that govern
traditional businesses.29 This both creates opportunities to move away from
26. E.g., Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 103 (2018) (examining the public sector); Katz & Krueger, supra
note 22, at 3; Gregory Ferenstein, How the Gig Economy Could Help Close the Skills Gap,
QUARTZ (Apr. 16, 2018), https://work.qz.com/1253396/the-gig-economy-could-help-solve-ourjob-training-problem/ [https://perma.cc/458R-VXRN]; The Online Platform Economy: Who
Earns
the
Most?,
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST.
(May
5,
2016),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/insight-online-platform-econ-earnings.htm
[https://perma.cc/ML8R-ZEGP]; Christine Schmidt, Holding Algorithms and the People Behind
Them Accountable, NIEMANLAB (Mar. 21, 2018, 11:38 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/
2018/03/holding-algorithms-and-the-people-behind-them-accountable-is-still-tricky-but-doable/
[https://perma.cc/B5EL-SBUD].
27. MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE, NECESSITY AND THE GIG
ECONOMY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/
Featured%20Insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/Independent%20work%20Choice%20n
ecessity%20and%20the%20gig%20economy/Independent-Work-Choice-necessity-and-the-gigeconomy-Executive-Summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/E68H-NUR9] (about 30% of platform
workers say that the gigs are their primary source of income).
28. SMITH, supra note 17, at 13.
29. Until the Court’s 2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, e-retailers were not required
to collect sales tax unless they had a physical presence in the state; e-commerce is now subject to
the same sales tax regulation as bricks-and-mortar retailers. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2081 (2018).
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the gendered norms of the manufacturing age and different obstacles to full
inclusion in the new economy.
New platform designers think of themselves as “disrupting” traditional
industries. This disruption often bypasses the large institutions and regulatory
apparatus of the administrative state. The result does not just circumvent legal
and administrative oversight; it also eliminates many of the traditional
institutions that establish norms, enforce standards, and provide
accountability for compliance with laws and regulations.30
While informal services, like the neighborhood teenage lawn mower,
always existed outside of the formal economy, the range of services in
platform world means that an ever-increasing number of people can aspire to
earn a living without a conventional employer. Indeed, some envision a time
when conventional companies can use similar platforms to assign workers to
tasks in more flexible and variable ways. Workers, in turn, will need only
access to the Internet and something to sell to generate income. To facilitate
these exchanges, the platforms themselves perform a variety of roles, such as
helping consumers find services, translating foreign languages, and creating
friendship and dating connections to others. Much of what these platforms do
parallels traditional activities in the same way that Uber and Lyft parallel the
operation of taxi companies. They nonetheless tend to differ from bricks-andmortar companies in at least two important ways, ways that have benefits and
disadvantages for the workers and the companies.
First, a major advantage of these innovations is that they are more flexible.
At least some of this flexibility arises from eliminating the middle “man”—
and the norms, standards, and accountability that come from institutionalized
practices. If you call a taxi company, the taxi company owners typically
secure licensing, supply cabs, hire workers, provide insurance, and oversee
training, maintenance, and other operations.31 If you call Uber, the driver who
picks you up will typically be an independent contractor, who drives her own
car, arranges her own insurance, and determines which rides she will provide.
She may have never met an Uber executive or supervisor or even another
Uber driver; customer interactions and evaluations are more likely to shape
her expectations about appropriate job performance than company

30. To be sure, there are some piecemeal efforts. See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons &
William Neuman, This Time It’s Uber on the Defensive in Battle with New York, N.Y. TIMES (July
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/nyregion/uber-nyc-cap-city-council.html
[https://perma.cc/VE64-MRWK] (reporting that the City Council in New York City is
considering a one-year cap on licenses granted to for-hire vehicles).
31. Jonra Springs, Taxi Cab Company Structure, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/
taxi-cab-company-structure-15714.html [https://perma.cc/C8Y3-V78V] (last visited Jan. 13,
2019).
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mentoring.32 Thus, a major difference in platform world is the reliance on
independent contractors who work autonomously. They are not on the same
factory floor or even in the same building; they rely on “the company”
platform only for matching services. While the basic parameters of the job
may be the same, the standards that develop over time from shared
experiences, personal interactions, and institutionalized traditions do not
exist.33
Gig workers praise their ability to be on the job when they want, on their
own terms, to supplement other sources of income, to provide a way station
on their way to other employment or education. Many Uber drivers could not
become and would not want to be taxi drivers, in part because Uber gives
greater opportunities to adjust their schedules to optimal demand time and
make more money,34 or to work when their children are in school or to fill in
odd bits of time between other jobs or classes. These new workplaces provide
an alternative to hierarchical employment structures because workers create
their own employment. Algorithm users laud the utility of data mining and
the related concept of machine learning to facilitate greater flexibility as the
algorithms seamlessly match worker and employer, and buyer and seller

32. Ellen Huet, Uber Skimps on Driver Training, Then Charges Drivers $65 for Basic
Driver Skills Course, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/ellenhuet/2014/10/08/uber-skimps-on-driver-training-then-charges-drivers-65-for-basicdriver-skills-course/#2076f6a022b4 [https://perma.cc/MQ8E-TF5W] (examining the lack of
training).
33. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1032–35. There are virtual communities; e.g., ShuYi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion
Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56, 66–68 (2017) (studying discussions in three online groups).
34. See M. Keith Chen et al., The Value of Flexible Work: Evidence from Uber Drivers 11–
13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23296, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23296.pdf [https://perma.cc/M47X-TXBH]; Jacob Passy, What
Uber Drivers Can Teach America About Work-Life Balance, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 5, 2017, 6:50
AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-uber-drivers-can-teach-america-about-work-lifebalance-2017-04-04?link=MW_latest_news [https://perma.cc/ZF5S-ZZ63].
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preferences.35 They also substitute continuously updated customer
evaluations for formal supervision.36
Second, platform world is subject to relatively little government
regulation, either with respect to workers or customers. By the height of the
industrial era, the state had built protections for workers into the
standardization of employment.37 Federal and state legislation separates fulltime workers, who enjoy greater benefits and protections, from part-time
workers.38 The government normalized the forty-hour work week, required
higher overtime pay, and systematically regulated working conditions for
these full-time workers. It subsidized benefits such as health care when
provided by an employer, and offered antidiscrimination protection in the
context of specific categories such as employment and education. Public
oversight policed health and safety conditions at workplaces, hotels,
restaurants, and other places, for the benefit of workers and patrons.
Licensing requirements, such as those for taxi companies, established
insurance requirements and accountability.
Few of these protections, for either workers or customers, apply to
platform world. The workers in platform world are primarily independent
contractors, and the Fair Labor Standards Act protections, health insurance
tax subsidies, and other benefits and protections described above simply do
not apply to them.39
35. See, e.g., Joe Dysart, How Lawyers Are Mining the Information Mother Lode for
Pricing, Practice Tips and Predictions, A.B.A. J. (May 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/the_dawn_of_big_data [https://perma.cc/84PD-8TKJ]; Stephen Goldsmith, Big
Data, Analytics and a New Era of Efficiency in Government, GOVERNING (May 22, 2013, 5:00
PM), http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-big-data-analytics-government-efficiency.html
[https://perma.cc/H3Z2-9S69]; Nathan Sinnott, How Machine Learning Is Changing the World—
and Your Everyday Life, ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/
312016?utm_campaign=EDailyTips&utm_source=MorningBrew&utm_medium=Newslettter
[https://perma.cc/P2C7-LAMB].
36. See, e.g., Julia Sklar, Hired and Fired by Algorithm, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541576/hired-and-fired-by-algorithm/
[https://perma.cc/XP6V-VRT7].
37. See June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 992
(2017); Senator Elizabeth Warren, Remarks at the New America Annual Conference:
Strengthening the Basic Bargain for Workers in the Modern Economy, (May 19, 2016),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-5-19_Warren_New_America_
Remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7T4-W7ZN].
38. Part-time workers typically receive lower wages and fewer benefits (such as health
insurance or pensions) than full-time workers do. Nantiya Ruan, Corporate Masters & Low-Wage
Servants: The Social Control of Workers in Poverty, 24 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 103,
137 (2017).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018); see, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d
131, 134 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Yochai Benkler, Challenges of the Sharing Economy, YOUTUBE
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Platform economy creators thus have a competitive advantage over
traditional employers because they bypass these regulations or pass on the
costs of compliance to individual workers. Uber, for example, does not need
to purchase taxi medallions, it requires its drivers to obtain their own
insurance, and it provides no paid sick leave; Airbnb claims exemption from
hotel regulations.40 And platform-based enterprises can easily frame their
operations to employ relatively few full-time workers of any kind.
Accordingly, the laws that address gender disparities, whether directly
through antidiscrimination provisions or indirectly by standardizing wages,
benefits, or working conditions for most employees, simply do not apply.
Ultimately, data itself has become the market currency—replacing more
consciously created institutional and social practices.41 Omnipresent online
ads target customers based on browsing behavior, t-shirt companies use
Facebook to anticipate birthday and anniversary celebrations (or political
preferences), and employers can access a vast temporary labor force by
tapping into past employment or work preferences. The more that such
programs match their participants in terms of existing patterns or preferences,
however, the more that they are likely to reinforce gendered traits.
III.

GENDER DISPARITIES

The existence and meaning of gender disparities in platform world provide
the uncertainties at the core of this Article. For one thing, precise numbers
about work in the platform economy are difficult to find, and the data that do
exist are often inconsistent.42 It appears that women are somewhat more likely
than men to be workers on the labor platform, and to find that their gig income
is essential or important to their ability to support themselves and their

(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBF-GFDaCpE [https://perma.cc/37KVRQ3H] (commenting at a World Economic Forum conference that the collaborative economy lets
businesses circumvent their social obligations by transferring all of the risks—such as legal
actions—onto outside agents). This unprecedented externalization of risks eliminates the
responsibility and protection that businesses usually provide to their employees. Shellie Karabell,
Sharing Economy: Nice, but Does It Create Real Jobs?, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2017, 5:43 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekarabell/2017/01/29/sharing-economy-nice-but-does-itcreate-real-jobs/#5d36185238fc [https://perma.cc/8ZF4-8LBK].
40. Jeremy Quittner, Airbnb and Discrimination: Why It’s All So Confusing, FORTUNE (June
23, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/23/airbnb-discrimination-laws/ [https://perma.cc/7F9HD8CE].
41. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE
AGE OF BIG DATA 13–14 (2018).
42. E.g., Buchwald, supra note 20.
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families.43 At the same time, female customers seem warier of internet
platforms such as eBay or crowdfunded investments, and often take more
precautions when they do participate.44
The preliminary studies on those who derive income from platform world
seem to confirm the fears that gender disparities exist, and that even though
the platform economy is new, the disparities that exist in it based on gender,
race, or the combination of the two45 are not—although they may be
camouflaged by the flashiness of the new technology. Indeed, the nature of
the technology itself gives rise to concerns about the influence of gender. At
their most basic level, what platforms do is to match preferences: existing
preferences whether gender neutral, gender biased, or simply a reflection of
society’s existing gender attitudes. Moreover, precisely because platforms
eliminate many of the professional supervisors who judge worker
performance in other contexts, they are that much more dependent on
customer reviews, which many studies show to contain pervasive biases. And
to make matters worse, the use of algorithms almost seems designed to build
in the gendered patterns of existing society; machine learning, after all,
tapped to scan and sort resumes, can easily conclude that Allison might be
better for a nursery school teaching position than Ethan.46
The resulting disparities may not, however, constitute discrimination.
Gender disparities may have multiple causes, and while the algorithms that
drive platforms do sometimes incorporate bias, programmers have also

43. Julia Carpenter, The Reason Women Are Working More Side Hustles, CNN: MONEY
(Aug. 22, 2017, 11:04 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/03/pf/women-side-hustles/
index.html [https://perma.cc/W5QH-JDAF] (citing a survey by Bankrate revealing that “69% of
women say they use the extra money from a side hustle to help pay for living expenses, compared
to just 42% of men”).
44. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. See generally Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy,
Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 448, 454 (2009).
45. Will Knight, Is the Gig Economy Rigged?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602832/is-the-gig-economy-rigged/
[https://perma.cc/2U44-6LMM].
46. Matthew Hutson, Even Artificial Intelligence Can Acquire Biases Against Race and
Gender, SCIENCE (Apr. 13, 2017, 2:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/04/evenartificial-intelligence-can-acquire-biases-against-race-and-gender
[https://perma.cc/7GKML86T] (explaining a computer science web embedding association test—the AI version of the
implicit association test—in which computers “learn” words based on the context in which they
appear, and noting that the study by scientists at Bath in the United Kingdom and Princeton “found
that the embeddings for names like ‘Brett’ and ‘Allison’ were more similar to those for positive
words including love and laughter, and those for names like ‘Alonzo’ and ‘Shaniqua’ were more
similar to negative words like ‘cancer’ and ‘failure.’ To the computer, bias was baked into the
words.”).
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developed mechanisms to counter it.47 More fundamentally, not all of the
studies that show disparities convincingly show that discrimination is the
reason for the disparities.
The subparts of this section address the major sources of perceived
disparities, assess the quality of the empirical support for these disparities,
consider alternative explanations, and evaluate sources of concern other than
the disparities themselves. The sources of gender disparities in the platform
world often do not result from either the deliberate actions of platform
designers to exclude women, or even necessarily from what are thought of as
“implicit biases” in other contexts. Most online platforms are relatively open
to those who wish to access them. Instead, the disparities reflect four factors:
first, gendered differences in traits and preferences; second, women’s greater
vulnerability to male aggression and rule-breaking; third, women’s greater
assumption of responsibility for care work that benefits others; and fourth,
existing patterns in professional settings. In each case, the impact of the
platform economy on women involves the question of how platform design
increases or decreases the role of these factors. This section will pick up these
factors in turn as a way of showing the limits of traditional antidiscrimination
law.
A. Painting Nurseries Pink and Executive Suites Blue: Gendered
Differences in Traits and Preferences
This section considers the role of gendered patterns in the structure of the
platform economy in terms of “worries” and “realities.”48 The worries stem
from uncritical and (in the case of algorithms) unexamined use of gender
traits and stereotypes. This section then suggests a more complex reality: one
that depends not on the existence of such traits and preferences per se, but on
how they are used. It is not only that the stereotypes of bricks-and-mortar
47. Jackie Snow, New Research Aims to Solve the Problem of AI Bias in “Black Box”
Algorithms, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609338/newresearch-aims-to-solve-the-problem-of-ai-bias-in-black-box-algorithms/
[https://perma.cc/4ZYD-GJMZ].
48. As discussed infra notes 70–71, 187–88 and accompanying text, these traits are
stereotypes that are often based on empirically-documented data, albeit not necessarily
biologically-determined differences. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
L.J. 1, 41 (1995); see also Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women
Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 665 (1999); Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its
Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396 (2014).
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world are encoded in algorithms, or that artificial intelligence learns and
builds on these gendered patterns; it is that these preferences are cloaked and
then multiplied by an entity that is seemingly bias-free, a machine.49 The
section examines ads and algorithms, customers’ reviews, and other factors
in such terms.
1.

Algorithms and Ads: Preferences Multiplied?

Machine-based algorithms have become a useful means for everything
from shoving email into a spam folder to analyzing the side effects of
prescription drugs, to translating Turkish into English, to determining
creditworthiness, to managing Uber drivers.50 Machine learning involves
computerized analysis to find patterns in existing data, and then developing
an algorithm that will predict comparable patterns in new data; that is, the
algorithms are produced by analyzing data to find the statistical relationships
that result in useful predictions. These algorithms rely on customer ratings,
stated job preferences and times for work, past browsing history, speed of
driving, rate of sales or other data to establish their baselines.
The machines themselves have no preexisting animus, of course. Nor may
the programmers. Yet, they design algorithms that “learn” from existing
societal patterns.51 Such algorithms, on the basis of disparities in the raw data,
may conclude that the instructors who teach second grade are women and
those who teach engineers are men, coding these positions in gendered terms
on the basis of existing patterns.52 Google Translate, for example, relies on
language patterns to “learn” the meanings of different words.53 These patterns
49. Min Kyung Lee et al., Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and DataDriven Management on Human Workers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL ACM
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1603 (CHI 2015),
https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mklee/materials/Publication/2015-CHI_algorithmic_management.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29N6-V8S8].
50. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 2, at 673; Lee et al., supra note 49.
51. Hannah Devlin, AI Programs Reveal Racial and Gender Biases, Research Reveals,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/13/ai-programsexhibit-racist-and-sexist-biases-research-reveals [https://perma.cc/G3UH-PNQS].
52. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 26, at 123–26; David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing
with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 653, 703–04 (2017) (identifying four overlapping factors: disadvantageously defined
outcome variables; data collected in a non-representative manner; data with preexisting human
biases baked in; and a particular set of input variables more predictive for one group than another).
53. Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, Semantics Derived
Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-like Biases, 356 SCIENCE 183, 183
(2017), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/356/6334/183 [https://perma.cc/S79L-9XWY];
Jack Morse, Google Translate Might Have a Gender Problem, MASHABLE (Nov. 30, 2017),
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may cause certain groups to be represented in distinct culturally or genderspecific contexts.54 Consequently, an existing semantic bias is folded into the
Translate algorithm; even though, for example, Turkish has only a genderneutral pronoun, the program translates Turkish to English in a manner that
reinforces gendered occupational patterns (women are cooks, men are
engineers).55 Over time, these effects are cumulative as they skew
applications, hiring patterns, and performance ratings in ways that may not
be apparent at the time the algorithms are created.56
a.

The Appearance of Disparities

One of the most pervasive use of gendered algorithms involves internet
ads.57 Go on your computer and look at shoe sales. For the next several days,
shoe ads may pop up on your computer, typically tracking the style and
gender of the shoes you searched for. Does anyone care—beyond the
annoyance and distraction produced by the ads? Probably not. Everyone buys
shoes and the fit and styles for men and women differ. Besides, if a woman
searches for men’s shoes, she will get ads coded male. The algorithm does
not care who the buyer is; it is only trying to determine what she wants.
Of greater concern is ads for high paying or powerful positions. These ads
can easily be sources of bias, whether designed by algorithms or Madison
Avenue executives. Indeed, researchers have developed lists of words
associated with male and female stereotypes.58 The stereotypically male
words include: competitive, confident, decisive, leader, self-sufficient; the
female words include: committed, dependable, empathetic, nurturing,
https://mashable.com/2017/11/30/google-translate-sexism/#YF9lqmcoZsqH
[https://perma.cc/FPG5-HN3Q].
54. See Reuben Binns, Fairness in Machine Learning: Lessons from Political Philosophy,
81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 9 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/
binns18a/binns18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/T23U-RFA7] (defining “representational fairness” as
the means through which “certain groups are represented in digital cultural artefacts, such as
natural language classifiers”).
55. Morse, supra note 53.
56. Dina Bass & Ellen Huet, Researchers Combat Gender and Racial Bias in Artificial
Intelligence, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2017, 5:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-12-04/researchers-combat-gender-and-racial-bias-in-artificial-intelligence
[https://perma.cc/G937-BBTR]; Bettina Büchel, Artificial Intelligence Could Reinforce Society’s
Gender
Equality
Problems,
CONVERSATION (Mar.
1,
2018,
11:00
AM),
http://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-could-reinforce-societys-gender-equalityproblems-92631 [https://perma.cc/N353-ZVMD].
57. See William K. Darley & Robert E. Smith, Gender Differences in Information
Processing Strategies: An Empirical Test of the Selectivity Model in Advertising Response, 24 J.
ADVERT. 41, 41–43 (1995).
58. Danielle Gaucher et al., Evidence That Gendered Wording in Job Advertisements Exists
and Sustains Gender Inequality, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 109–18 (2011).
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responsive, understanding—sadly, not the qualities search firms and human
resource departments link with the highest paying positions.59 The
researchers find further that job postings for male-dominated occupations
typically contain more stereotypically masculine words than jobs for femaledominated occupations, but female-dominated occupations use both types of
descriptions.60 They also find that the greater the association of a position
with stereotypically male attributes, the less favorably women rate the
position, though the use of stereotypically feminine terms has much less of
an impact on men’s rating of the jobs.61
The effects of these descriptions on applicant pools can be dramatic and,
indeed, use of such terms can double the gender gap in applications.62 For one
of the most highly publicized examples, Google allowed researchers access
to its demographic metrics, and the researchers examined two different types
of ads. They found that applying the selection metrics might mean that
women would become less likely to see ads for higher-paying executive
jobs.63 The study also looked at ads for a career coaching service that offered
to help prepare applicants to land positions paying over $200,000 per year. 64
Although the results were not statistically significant because of the small
sample size, these ads produced the most startling results because the Google
algorithm showed them only to males.65 The 2015 study, which claimed to be
the first of its kind documenting bias in this type of activity, seemed to show
the risks of the new technology.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 114–15 (concluding the “lack of an effect for feminine wording suggests that
gendered wording . . . is not simply the result of a perceptual process whereby people make
inferences about the traits required for jobs based on roles traditionally held by men and women”).
61. Id. at 117. The identification of a product, however, such as Virginia Slims, with women
does reduce male interest.
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Competitive
Workplaces Deter Female Workers? A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Job Entry
Decisions, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 122, 124 (2014) (indicating the gender gap in applications more
than doubles when a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends on relative performance, reflecting
greater female than male aversion to such environments).
63. Amit Datta et al., Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings, 2015 PROC. ON
PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 92, 102, http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/danupam/dtdpets15.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGH8-EP6R] (using machine learning to simulate the impact of
demographic factors such as gender on Google ad selection).
64. See id.
65. Id.; Garett Sloane, Online Ads for High-Paying Jobs Are Targeting Men More Than
Women, ADWEEK (July 7, 2015), https://www.adweek.com/digital/seemingly-sexist-adtargeting-offers-more-men-women-high-paying-executive-jobs-165782/
[https://perma.cc/QS4M-JKLT].
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The Complex Sources of Gender Disparities

The practical realities are more complicated. First, with or without
algorithms, many companies use ads that skew their applicant pools.66 In such
suits, they may not face legal liability for using words (such as “ninja” and
“rockstar”), but the impact is similar to that at the core of the secondgeneration Title VII lawsuits.
With respect to employment, companies hiring high-paid executives are
subject to antidiscrimination laws. It is standard practice for the human
relations departments in such companies to seek to produce a diverse
applicant pool, particularly if the existing executive labor force is skewed.
Companies that find that Google ads produce a less diverse applicant pool
than other sources can be expected to rely on them less—at least if the
companies value diversity or fear the implications of possible allegations of
discrimination. Moreover, even under existing law, continued reliance on a
source of applicants known to produce fewer women or minority applicants
should be viewed as evidence of discriminatory intent, particularly where the
company starts with substantial underrepresentation of women or other
protected groups.67 In this sense, use of an algorithm that produces ads
targeting men is not fundamentally different from any other recruitment
method that skews the applicant pool in comparison with alternative
recruitment techniques.
Second, the Google study itself involved a simulation, not a description of
the pattern of actual dissemination of particular ads. It thus does not show
discrimination actually occurring, but simply how it might occur.
On the other hand, the FTC has investigated some executive coaching
firms as potential frauds.68 Even those who recommend such services note
that the profession is unregulated and unlicensed, unlike psychological
counseling or other services, and while not “as prone to hucksters as life
66. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Target Corporation to
Pay $2.8 Million to Resolve EEOC Discrimination Finding (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-24-15.cfm [https://perma.cc/69F8-6327]; Stacy
Jones & Grace Donnelly, Walmart’s New Jobs Approach Could Be Undermined by Gender Bias,
FORTUNE
(Apr.
4,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/04/04/walmart-jobs-gender-bias/
[https://perma.cc/Q5S7-QBEG] (“After collecting and analyzing 4,400 U.S.-based Walmart job
postings, Fortune found that the language in 51% of job descriptions is more likely to appeal to
men than women. That imbalance tips even more as openings travel up the corporate ladder,
where 53% of manager positions and 84% of the director-level job descriptions skew male.”).
67. This is why “word of mouth” recruiting that impermissibly replicates the racial or
gendered composition of a workforce is actionable discrimination under disparate impact theory.
Thomas v. Wash. Cty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990).
68. Lesley Fair, FTC Blows the Whistle on Business Coaching Program, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (June 26, 2017, 11:28 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/
2017/06/ftc-blows-whistle-business-coaching-program [https://perma.cc/YB3S-UUDJ].
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coaching is, . . . there’s still the potential for exploitation, harm, or
simply a waste of time and money.” 69
These Internet ads thus represent a classic example of the kinds of
circumstances where gender disparities can be expected to be rife and may
be exploited to the benefit of those running the ads. Indeed, such ads appear
designed to pique stereotypically male interest and discourage those with
stereotypically female traits from seeking such services. By emphasizing
salary to the exclusion of other characteristics, they appeal to greed and
hubris.70 Because the services are of uncertain value and the coaches feel
pressure to recruit, they involve risk71—a classic subject of gender
stereotyping. They also offer the lure of high rewards—reputable coaching
can in fact increase the ability to land and keep a high paying job, particularly
for those who need help breaking into the right networks or honing
interviewing skills. And the ability to advertise online increases the ability of
new coaches to enter the field and the difficulty for consumers to tell the
differences between the effective professionals and those winging it.72 In
short, the promotion of this type of coaching service replicates the factors
researchers find in gender differences on the web more generally. Women are
more likely to perceive the web as a dangerous place, warier that they will be
the victim of frauds73 or hucksterism, less likely (with good reason) to see
themselves as the beneficiaries of the upsides from services such as this type
of coaching, and thus less likely to shell out substantial sums for the hope of
landing an advantage in securing a high paying job.
69. Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Career Coaches: When Are They Worth Their Salt?,
FORTUNE (Nov. 6, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/11/06/career-coaches-when-are-they-worththeir-salt/ [https://perma.cc/DZ8W-9WUV].
70. Indeed, women are much more reluctant to apply for jobs unless they meet all the
eligibility criteria for the position: a study at Hewlett Packard showed that “[m]en apply for a job
when they meet only 60% of the qualifications, but women apply only if they meet 100% of
them.” Tara Sophia Mohr, Why Women Don’t Apply for Jobs Unless They’re 100% Qualified,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 25, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08/why-women-dont-apply-for-jobsunless-theyre-100-qualified [https://perma.cc/DD8M-6YY8].
71. Indeed, the standard advice is to “[b]e wary of someone who tries to manipulate or use
mind games, like asking for a $20,000 up-front commitment and when you demur, accusing you
of not being committed to the process.” Lewis, supra note 69.
72. See id. (advising that signs of a coach’s reputability involve being “part of a community
of coaches” and having a reputation to uphold—factors that are easier to determine through
personal referrals than online ads); see also Russ Alan Prince, Are Business Coaches Worth the
Time
and
Money?,
FORBES
(June
9,
2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
russalanprince/2015/06/09/are-business-coaches-worth-the-time-and-money/#257de8a15cfe
[https://perma.cc/ZRY5-TYGU] (noting the difficulty in determining the value of such coaching).
73. Fraud goes far beyond customer reviews, although the gendered impact is difficult to
assess. See Laura Stevens, On Amazon, Fake Products Plague Smaller Brands, WALL ST. J. (July
19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/on-amazon-fake-products-plague-smaller-brands1532001601?mod=hp_lead_pos4 [https://perma.cc/DF8T-9ZT2].
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Even if Google’s algorithm is the source of gender disparities in targeting
customers, existing antidiscrimination law does not address such ads that
simply embody gendered stereotypes. Indeed, the law banning sex
discrimination arguably would not apply to ads for a coaching service rather
than for the position itself.74 In the United States, the law simply does not
intervene when advertisements reinforce discriminatory cultural messages.75
Legally, generating interest in such services is no different from selling chain
saws, which are also subject to culturally stereotyped ads that typically
display pictures of brawny construction workers, suggesting the
identification of power tools with a form of employment that is 98% male.76
74. It is not like housing, subprime lending, or job ads—where there are specific statutory
protections. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (In a lawsuit against an online service provider for an ad that
allegedly violated the Fair Housing Act, the court held “[i]f craigslist ‘causes’ the discriminatory
notices, then so do phone companies and courier services . . . yet no one could think that
Microsoft and Dell are liable for ‘causing’ discriminatory advertisements. . . . [The plaintiff]
cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in
unlawful discrimination.”). These findings replicate what law professor John Banzhaf found in
the 1980s about gender-based pricing for dry cleaning: a male researcher picked up a gender
neutral article of clothing from a dry cleaners, such as a button down shirt; he walked out of the
store, crumpled up the shirt, handed it off to a female colleague who took it in to the same store
for dry cleaning and later had to pay up to a 200% mark-up. Kara Swisher, Consummate
Consumer; Pressing Charges—Students Fight Discriminatory Fees, WASH. POST, June 29, 1989,
at D5, as excerpted at PROFESSOR JOHN F. BANZHAF III, http://banzhaf.net/docs/shirts.html
[https://perma.cc/P4YD-ZF9G] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
75. While some companies voluntarily pull stereotypic ads in response to customer
complaints, these are the exception and not the norm. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Shaping
Expectations About Dads as Caregivers: Toward an Ecological Approach, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV.
183, 192 (2016) (“In 2012, Huggies diapers discontinued a television advertisement that portrayed
fathers as too incompetent to change diapers.”); see also Marie-Helen Maras & Lauren R. Shapiro,
Child Sex Dolls and Robots: More than Just an Uncanny Valley, 21 J. INTERNET L. 3, 17 n.12
(2017) (“Both France and the United Kingdom have specific guidelines for ads to prevent ‘sexist
and discriminatory ads’ that promote gender stereotypes, sexually objectify women, or promote
an unhealthy body image.” (quoting Britain to Ban All Ads That Objectify Women or Promote
Gender
Stereotypes,
WOMEN
WORLD
(July
19,
2017),
https://womenintheworld.com/2017/07/19/britain-to-ban-all-advertisements-that-objectifywomen-or-promote-gender-stereotypes/ [https://perma.cc/9AY9-CJ79])).
76. See Gender’s Role in Purchases: I Don’t Mean to Sound Sexist, but . . . , STEVENSON
CO.: TRAQLINE BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), https://stevensoncompany.com/genders-role-in-purchasesi-dont-mean-to-sound-sexist-but/ [https://perma.cc/V8KZ-A6S4] (men buy 68% of power tools
in the United States); Statistics of Women in Construction, NAT’L ASS’N WOMEN CONSTRUCTION,
https://www.nawic.org/nawic/statistics.asp [https://perma.cc/59UD-6NVT] (last visited Jan. 26,
2019) (women constitute under 2% of construction workers). When ad executives seek to sell
power tools to women, however, they know how to do it. They put a picture of a smiling woman
in the ad, with the words “Santa Claus” in the background. Cf. Till Speicher et al., Potential for
Discrimination in Online Targeted Advertising 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES., 2018,
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/speicher18a/speicher18a.pdf (describing different strategies
advertisers use to target consumers based on demographics, behavior, or interests).
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Takeaways

Does—or should—the existence of gender disparities in targeting
customers constitute legally actionable discrimination? If the coaching
services in fact increase gender disparities in access to top management jobs,
the answer should be yes, leaving open the question of how to address such
disparities.77 If the answer is that these ads demonstrate a gendered effort to
prey on gullible or hubristic men, the answer depends on something other
than the role of gender in the effort.
The emphasis on the gendered distribution of the Google ads may thus
distract from a focus on longer-term outcomes. Both legitimate high-end
coaches and unscrupulous peddlers are less likely to target women for these
services. The two farther reaching issues involve the coding of executive
positions in stereotypically male terms, a coding that is hardly limited to
algorithms or internet ads,78 and the reputability and value of coaching
services, which involves both the potential for hucksterism and issues of
access not so different from SAT prep courses. As algorithms that employ
data mining become ubiquitous, they should neither shield their creators from
responsibility for the outcomes nor distract attention from the need to address
the larger question of how they are used. These questions go beyond targeting
the recipients of the ads to the larger questions of executive recruitment.
The ridesharing services, for example, offer a different model. Consider
Uber. Even when “[o]nly 14% of U.S. Uber drivers [we]re women,” this was
still “higher than the 12.7% of taxi drivers and chauffeurs who were women
and much higher than the 1% of New York City cabbies that [we]re
women.”79 Competitors Lyft and Sidecar made more of an effort to recruit
female drivers, using ads that specifically target women who google

77. Employers are better positioned to address these disparities than customers, much the
same way universities are better positioned than students to address disparities in access to SAT
prep courses.
78. See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 4, at 446.
79. Ellen Huet, Why Aren’t There More Female Uber and Lyft Drivers?, FORBES (Apr. 9,
2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/04/09/female-uber-lyft-drivers
[https://perma.cc/5ATS-DRZJ]. A 2016 report put the number of women taxi drivers and
chauffeurs a bit higher. Taxi Drivers & Chauffeurs, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/
profile/soc/533041/ [https://perma.cc/6J7Y-ASDF] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
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information about these services,80 and even Uber, by 2018, had substantially
increased the number of women drivers worldwide.81
Accordingly, platform world’s incorporation of machine learning—while
it has the potential to increase discrimination—also has the potential to
ameliorate it. It depends on what the machines “learn.” That, in turn, depends
on something more than the nature of the technology.
2.

Customer Ratings and Gender Bias

If there is any distinguishing feature of platform world, it is the
substitution of customer reviews for the personal supervision and feedback
in more traditional workplaces. Online reviews rank employers and products
and are designed to provide confidence about the quality and trustworthiness
of goods and services. These online reviews have become ubiquitous,
addressing everything from dental services to the suitability of particular
shoes for narrow or wider feet. Of course, there are serious and complex
issues of what counts as acceptable and unacceptable consumer preferences;
of how easy or difficult it is for platforms to sort out acceptable from
unacceptable consumer preferences; and of what duty the platforms have to
do so.82
Nonetheless, every serious examination of these reviews, however,
questions their reliability. Customers cannot evaluate safety as well as

80. Huet, supra note 79. Indeed, when one of the authors did a Google search for
information on the percentage of female Uber drivers, a pop-up ad appeared with a picture of
women drivers and the offer of a signing bonus for joining Lyft. The algorithms that direct Lyft
ads do appear to be targeting women (us!) in their recruitment efforts. The ad directed from Huet,
supra note 79, to Minneapolis-St. Paul Drivers Make Up to $23/hr Driving Their Car, LYFT,
https://perma.cc/N8AQ-QTZN.
81. Distribution of Uber’s Employees Worldwide in 2017 and 2018, by Gender, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/693807/uber-employee-gender-global/
[https://perma.cc/Q3V2-NB9N ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
82. Indeed, the issues of what performance criteria are legitimately part of a job description,
and of what customer preferences are “biases,” are quite subtle and highly contested; our
examples simplify these distinctions, analyzing objective performance criteria. We still have not
developed “normative principles that can help distinguish cases in which platforms would be
wrong to infringe on users’ personal autonomy from those in which platforms can override users’
preferences in the interest of combating discrimination.” Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing
Against Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1234 (2017); see
generally Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
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professionals, and fraud in the production of reviews is sufficiently frequent
that the FTC has investigated such claims.83
Moreover, while many websites allow customers to leave comments and
reviews, they do not allow the workers to post such information or responses,
meaning that bad reviews can remain without comment or explanation.84
Nonetheless, online reviews influence consumer behavior, and women
customers, who tend to be warier of online purchases than men, are more
likely to rely on them.85
Platforms can—and do—take steps to manage this problem,86 but they
cannot verify the legitimacy of each review. Accordingly, there is every
reason to expect existing societal biases to influence the reviews; nonetheless,
platform companies use the reviews in ways that defy any single
characterization.
a.

The Appearance of Gender Disparities

Every serious analysis of customer reviews shows some bias, inside or
outside of platform world.87 The most rigorous studies of bricks-and-mortar
world, which involve customer reviews of a variety of services, indicate that
83. David Streitfeld, Online Reviews? Researchers Give Them a Low Rating, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/technology/online-reviews-researchersgive-them-a-low-rating.html [https://perma.cc/GMV2-5CVX]; see also Mark W. Gifford, Online
Reputation Management, WYO. LAW., Feb. 2018, at 30, 33, https://www.wyomingbar.org/
february-2018-wyoming-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/YR8X-3C8Y] (“In 2013, the FTC estimated
that 15 to 20 percent of online reviews are falsified.” (citing Is Your Law Firm Next in the
Crosshairs for Posting “Fake” Online Reviews?, https://www.majux.com/law-firm-next-incross-posting-fake-online-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/BKP8-W6YE])).
84. E.g., Julia Ticona & Alexandra Mateescu, How Domestic Workers Wager Safety in the
Platform Economy, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40541050/
how-domestic-workers-wager-safety-in-the-platform-economy [https://perma.cc/9J79-XWXG];
JULIA TICONA, ALEXANDRA MATEESCU & ALEX ROSENBLAT, BEYOND DISRUPTION: HOW TECH
SHAPES LABOR ACROSS DOMESTIC WORK & RIDESHARING 32 (2018), https://datasociety.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Data_Society_Beyond_Disruption_FINAL.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/B4XC-J7D2] (discussing the speed of termination of gig worker’s accounts for
alleged infractions).
85. Soonyong Bae & Taesik Lee, Gender Differences in Consumers’ Perceptions of Online
Consumer
Reviews,
11
ELECTRONIC
COM.
RES.
201,
211
(2011),
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Gender-differences-in-consumers’-perception-of-BaeLee/870b32bd703b1b18a1a9893b53041881feeb476e [https://perma.cc/XHZ9-K7FV]; Kate
Ashford, Online Consumer Reviews Aren’t All That Useful, Study Finds, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateashford/2016/04/29/online-reviews/#66c8a9354922
[https://perma.cc/UPY7-37C4] (estimating that 5% of online reviews are fake).
86. E.g., Levy & Barocas, supra note 82, at 1226–27.
87. Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV.
223, 224 (2016).
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biases may be pervasive. A comprehensive review of customer service
evaluations, for example, that varied the settings to include higher end and
lower end services and to control for more objective evaluations of
performance, found racial and gender biases to be significant.88 Moreover,
the study found that such biases affected not just individual evaluations but
also overall evaluations of the organization where women constituted a larger
percentage of the personnel.89 Unsurprisingly, the study reported that
customer biases increased with indications of the reviewer’s bias on the
implicit association test.
A different study of service providers in higher education found that men
were evaluated more highly than women; at least part of the explanation for
negative reviews was that customers often did blame the messenger when
they got answers they did not like.90 And a study of phone-based customer
service representatives found that while the customers were equally satisfied
with male and female representatives, the customers were more satisfied with
representatives of the opposite gender than representatives of the same
gender.91 To the extent that platforms depend to a greater degree than other
organizations on these reviews, bias in the reviews is an obvious source of
concern.92
The early indication is that such biases affect platform world in similar
ways. A study of TaskRabbit and Fivver, for example, found that an
important source of bias involved the number of reviews. On TaskRabbit,
women receive significantly fewer reviews, “especially White women,” and
“gender and race have significant negative correlations with search rank,” in
part because of the way that the search algorithm incorporated the results of
88. David R. Hekman et al., An Examination of Whether and How Racial and Gender
Biases Influence Customer Satisfaction, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 238, 256 (2010).
89. Id. at 253.
90. Robin L. Snipes et al., Gender Bias in Customer Evaluations of Service Quality:
An Empirical Investigation, 20 J. SERV. MARKETING 274, 278–80 (2006), https://doi.org/
10.1108/08876040610674616 [https://perma.cc/RG6V-5EDL]. When someone called up
customer service and got what they wanted, they rated the rep highly. When they called up and
got an answer they didn’t like, they rated the rep negatively. The differences shrink when that is
taken into account, but they don’t disappear.
91. Dan Moshavi, He Said, She Said: Gender Bias and Customer Satisfaction with Phone‐
Based Service Encounters, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 162, 169, 172–74 (2004).
92. Employers are not insulated from liability by their customers’ biases, but platforms are
in a position where they are neither employers nor necessarily charged with responsibility for
determining the basis for customer evaluations. See Rachel L. Cantor, Comment, Consumer
Preferences for Sex and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ
Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493, 507; Alex Rosenblat, Uber’s Pax: Hidden Bias in Rating
Systems 2 (Dec. 30, 2015) (Comput.-Supported Coop. Work Workshop: Algorithms at Work,
working paper), https://algorithmsatwork.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/rosenblat-uber_s-paxbias-in-rating-systems-cscw-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6J3-5TSP].
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the reviews.93 By contrast, women received more positive results than men
on Fivver, and the TaskRabbit reviews favored men over women in some
cities but not others.94 The results may reflect not just gender biases, but the
intersection of race and gender, and the different composition of the
population in each city.95
b.

The Sources of Gender Disparities

While customer reviews do show bias, the legal issue is the impact of these
reviews on worker pay, promotion, and opportunities. Customer reviews have
dramatically greater impact on business outcomes when they become part of
ranking systems rather than as part of more complex screening systems
designed to weed out less competent performers.96 Many product searchers
allow customers to list products in accordance with customer reviews, as do
most restaurant sites. These ranking systems can affect business success
because often customers see only the products, restaurants, or workers with
the highest rankings. This has invited fraud—with some entities producing
fake reviews,97 often using bots to produce endless numbers of them.98 It has
also encouraged manipulation. Numerous guides advise businesses on how
93. See, e.g., Anikó Hannák et al., Bias in Online Freelance Marketplaces: Evidence from
TaskRabbit and Fiverr, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER
SUPPORTED WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 1914, 1915, 1927, https://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=2998327 [https://perma.cc/5H3U-HSG3] (finding both gendered and racialized
dimensions: “More problematically, we observe algorithmic bias in search results on TaskRabbit:
perceived gender and race have signiﬁcant negative correlations with search rank, although the
impacted group changes depending on which city we examine.”).
94. Id. at 1922–23.
95. Id. at 1915.
96. Customer ratings are so important that the FTC regulates them, requiring that the rater
be a bona fide user, and that any incentives be disclosed. Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-publishes-final-guidesgoverning-endorsements-testimonials/091005revisedendorsementguides.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LVM9-6PMP]. For a discussion of how they are used, see, for example, AARON
SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RES. CTR., ONLINE SHOPPING AND E-COMMERCE (2016),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2016/12/16113209/PI_2016.12.19_
Online-Shopping_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/66WM-M3Y9].
97. For a claim of fake reviews on eBay, see vintageneil, Top 10 Ebay Cons, EBAY (Aug.
10,
2017),
https://www.ebay.com/gds/10-TOP-EBAY-CONS-A-GUIDE-TO-COMMONFRAUDS-ON-EBAY-/10000000002145432/g.html [https://perma.cc/LDT2-3Z4F].
98. Patrick Kulp, Online Reviews Have a Major Trust Problem, MASHABLE (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://mashable.com/2017/11/09/online-reivews-maybe-broken/#9ROsJD2qxqqq
[https://perma.cc/296J-CLJD]; Tim McIntyre, Consumers Put Too Much Faith in Online
Reviews, Experts Warn, NEWS.COM.AU (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.news.com.au/
finance/money/costs/consumers-put-too-much-faith-in-online-reviews-experts-warn/newsstory/ad9accd01b5a2e1521e061faa344f711 [https://perma.cc/NXB3-5CFG].
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to manage reviews, often by encouraging them to ensure that satisfied
customers post them, and by responding promptly to customer complaints.99
Platforms typically have more controls than restaurant or hotel sites to
prevent fake reviews, but they cannot prevent their workers from reminding
customers of the importance of reviews, which could account for the smaller
number of reviews women receive on TaskRabbit, for example. Studies in
other contexts, however, indicate that customers may tolerate self-interested
behavior from men more than from women.100 Accordingly, we do not yet
have a full picture of what drives the reported gender disparities.
Some platforms, however, use reviews not to rank but to screen. eBay and
Uber, for example, rely heavily on customer evaluations to identify problem
sellers and drivers.101 On eBay, women have higher customer evaluations
than men, and there is no indication of gender differences in evaluations on
Uber. The reason may be that these platforms do not use customer evaluations
to compare different individuals to each other. Instead, they use them to weed
out problem sellers and drivers. As a result, virtually all of the repeat
performers on these platforms have high evaluations. As a practical matter,
therefore, while some critics complain that the Uber type systems that use
ratings primarily to weed out problem drivers do not give customers enough
information, they may work to women’s benefit compared to more steeply
graded systems, which may either reflect bias or encourage manipulation to
a greater degree.102

99. See, e.g., Alison DeNisco Rayome, 7 Best Practices for Managing Online Reviews of
Your Business, TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/7-bestpractices-for-managing-online-reviews-of-your-business/ [https://perma.cc/BXR9-BQJM].
100. Rosanna E. Guadagno & Robert B. Cialdini, Gender Differences in Impression
Management in Organizations: A Qualitative Review, 56 SEX ROLES 483, 486 (2007),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.6656&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/XB43-D859]; Joanna Wolfe, Communication Styles in Engineering and Other
Male-Dominated Fields, in APPLYING RESEARCH TO PRACTICE (ARP) RESOURCES (Barbara
Bogue & Elizabeth Cady eds., 2012), https://www.engr.psu.edu/awe/ARPAbstracts/
CommunicationsSkills/ARP_CommunicationStyles_Literature%20Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B6YU-NBQE].
101. Rosenblat, supra note 92, at 2 n.6. Uber also allows drivers to rate customers, and some
reports of drivers retaliating against customers who give them low ratings all involve women
customers.
102. Another concern that is difficult to evaluate is driver retaliation against customers who
do not leave higher reviews. Journalistic accounts describe drivers becoming angrier at women
than men, but no data has been collected to date that confirms or rebuts these impressions. See
supra note 101; Jennings Brown, Some Uber Drivers Are Changing Rider Ratings in Retaliation
for Bad Reviews, GIZMODO (Aug. 7, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/some-uber-drivers-arechanging-rider-ratings-in-retalia-1797597564 [https://perma.cc/VP5C-64Y9].
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Takeaways

There is no compelling research to date as to whether customer reviews
are more or less biased than supervisors’ reviews in bricks-and-mortar world,
which also have pervasive indications of bias.103 The question instead is how
to mitigate the risk of bias in both contexts. Companies like eBay, as they
mature, end up with more repeat players and fewer amateurs testing out a new
platform. As that happens, the professionals become more adept at dealing
with customers, reducing the impact of customer bias. On eBay, for example,
many sellers provide less identifying information than they did in the early
days of the site, making it harder to tell whether the seller is male or female.
It remains to be seen, however, whether biased evaluations produce
differentials in the selection of the sellers and drivers who remain on these
platforms.104 In platforms such as TaskRabbit that depend on rankings, the
net effect may be to limit access to the platform, because rating systems may
be used to give jobs to workers.
The accuracy and fairness of these reviews should, therefore, be a source
of concern for anyone who relies on them, with the biggest questions going
forward being ones of access. Indeed, the best-documented examples of bias
in platform world involve race rather than gender, particularly on platforms
such as Airbnb.105
3.

Price and Gender

Platform world, in its disruption of standardized business practices,
creates an alternative system for setting prices. In bricks-and-mortar world,
most prices are fixed. In platform world, prices are more variable. In some
cases, they are the result of algorithms, which take into account factors such
103. Paola Cecchi-Dimeglio, How Gender Bias Corrupts Performance Reviews, and What
to Do About It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-gender-biascorrupts-performance-reviews-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/LV8X-JMC4]; Rachel
Emma Silverman, Gender Bias at Work Turns up in Feedback, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gender-bias-at-work-turns-up-in-feedback-1443600759
[https://perma.cc/GX2J-YFDA].
104. We do know that women Uber drivers experience higher turnover than the men, but this
could be true for a number of reasons.
105. The response had been to consider alternate platforms such as Noirbnb, which attempts
to match participants willing to seek out minority sellers and buyers rather than risk the potential
of race-based discrimination. About Us, NOIRBNB, http://noirbnb.com/about.html
[https://perma.cc/33B6-JGXU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“Noirbnb is a global travel community
that provides experiences and events with a focus on including and celebrating travelers of color.
. . . Noirbnb was born in October 2015 after our co-founder, Stefan’s experience while booking a
stay in Atlanta.”).
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as surge pricing. In other cases, though, the prices are the result of auctions
or negotiations. Variable pricing can interact with biases and gender
stereotyping to raise questions about its systemic fairness.
a.

The Appearance of Gender Disparities

Well before the rise of platform world, researchers documented gender
disparities in the prices available to, and negotiated by, men and women.
Variable prices, such as those associated with car sales, tend to increase the
differences.106 And women tend to be dramatically underrepresented among
those selling on commission or in other contexts where aggressive behavior
to accumulate (or fleece)107 customers is an important component of the
job.108 Women may receive lower initial salaries because of a failure to
negotiate.109
The online world shows similar disparities. In an innovative experiment,
Hernan Galperin sent out a fictitious business solicitation from a marketing
services agency to several thousand freelance workers. The invitation was
signed by either “Maria” or “Jose.” Maria was charged substantially more
(22%) for the same job. Male freelancers were also more likely to negotiate,
even when the price was allegedly fixed.110
Another survey’s empirical evaluation of a global online platform that
connects potential workers with those needing that work found that women
set their hourly fees at a statistically significant level lower than men.111 Using
computational methods that captured some of the gendered interactions, the
researchers found that even when the online workers had the same years of
experience and the same education, and the same online ratings, women still
undercharged; while the average hourly rate for women was $28, it was $45
for men.112 The authors observed that women sometimes set lower initial

106. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991).
107. PAUL BABIAK & ROBERT D. HARE, SNAKES IN SUITS: WHEN PSYCHOPATHS GO TO WORK
97 (2006) (describing the psychology of high-pressure sales representatives).
108. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 312, 324 (7th Cir. 1988).
109. E.g., Naomi Schoenbaum, Ignorance as Equality (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
110. Hernan Galperin, Guillermo Cruces & Catrihel Greppi, Gender Interactions in Wage
Bargaining: Evidence from an Online Field Experiment 36 (Sept. 20, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3056508 [https://perma.cc/E48X-UDZC].
111. Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender in the GigEconomy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393, 408 (2017).
112. Id. The researchers could not determine, however, how much pay the workers actually
received.

51:0001]

DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN?

35

prices to avoid negotiations, and found that “leaning in” may not work for
them as well as it does for men.113
And women may be right to avoid negotiations, since problems can
become more complex when prices involve an interaction between sellers
and buyers. eBay, for example, sought to distinguish itself from online sales
platforms such as Amazon through the use of an auction system. With fixed
prices, Amazon encourages customer shopping through comparisons of price
and quality (with online customer evaluations influencing quality
determinations). By using an auction system, eBay adopted a very different
form of seller-buyer interaction; it became not just a form of shopping, but a
captivating and often addictive game—fueled by the thrill of “winning.”114
eBay thought of its auctions as consumer democracy, effectively policing
themselves. It relied on customer ratings to test the reliability of its settings
and assumed that “most people are honest.”115 Since then, the novelty of the
auction format has lost its allure, and fraudulent transactions have given eBay
headaches.116 Today, only a minority of the goods sold on eBay employ the
auction format.117 Nonetheless, when the auction format was at its height, it
produced notable gender disparities. Although eBay, in developing an
auction framework, removed the direct face-to-face interactions between
buyers and sellers and attracted many female sellers, customers (and
researchers) could typically identify gender. Studies during this period
showed that men tended to outnumber women sellers by at least three to one,
and women did less well than men within the auction format.118 A review of
113. Id. at 420 (noting that women tend to set lower prices to avoid negotiations, and that
“leaning in” has more negative consequences for women than men).
114. “For many, perhaps most, people, this was their first experience with auctions. The
novelty, the competition, and the thrill of winning all came together in an intoxicating
brew . . . You didn’t buy a product, you won an auction. And the competitive thrill meant that lots
of customers were willing to pay more.” James Surowiecki, Going, Going, Gone: Who Killed the
Internet
Auction?,
WIRED
(May
17,
2011,
9:48
PM),
https://www.wired.com/2011/05/ff_endofauction/ [http://perma.cc/SV8N-5UZJ].
115. Anna Tims, Ebay Accused of Failing Its Sellers as Fraudulent Buyers Manipulate the
System, GUARDIAN (May 21, 2017, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/money/
2017/may/21/ebay-accused-failing-sellers-buyers-manipulate-system-protection
[http://perma.cc/LRR8-P9V6].
116. See id.
117. Chris Dawson, Are eBay Auctions a Thing of the Past?, TAMEBAY (Feb. 12, 2017, 6:54
PM),
https://tamebay.com/2017/02/are-ebay-auctions-a-thing-of-the-past.html
[http://perma.cc/6MTY-LJSR]; Surowiecki, supra note 114.
118. Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Tali Regev, How Many Cents on the Dollar? Women and Men
in
Product
Markets,
SCI.
ADVANCES,
Feb.
19,
2016,
at
2,
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/2/e1500599/tab-pdf
[http://perma.cc/DN5N-LZT7]
(finding women constituted 23.07% of all sellers, with a slightly higher percentage of them as
“Buy It Now” sellers and slightly fewer in the auction sales).

36

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

the auction sales indicates that when men and women sold identical products,
women received fewer bids and lower offers.119 Indeed, overall the
researchers found that women received 80 cents on the dollar for the new
(and thus presumptively identical) goods they sold, compared to the men,
though the differences declined to 97 cents on the dollar for used goods where
comparability is harder to measure.120 Women sellers, however, enjoyed
slightly higher reputation scores than the men, after controlling for
experience (women sellers had less) and other factors.121 And women buyers,
in turn, were more likely to buy from other women.122
Or consider Etsy, which conducted an online survey with almost one
hundred thousand sellers:
Etsy sellers, who are mostly women, report higher levels of
education than most Americans — yet, the average median income
for Etsy sellers is just $44,900, ten percent lower than the national
average. Twenty-six percent of Etsy sellers earn under $25,000 in
annual household income.123

One journalist asks, “Could it be a coincidence that the average Etsy seller
is female and college-educated, yet is still grossly underpaid?”124
Women may earn less on other platforms for related issues, also seen as
women’s “choice.”125 Thus, even through a platform where the hourly rates
are set by a third party, women may have different work patterns that lead
them to work less, or not at all, during the better-paid surge hours in the Uber-

119. Id. at 1.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Female customers also tended to pay higher prices for the identical items than male
customers, but the interaction between women’s tendency to pay higher prices and to buy from
women sellers disappeared once the researchers controlled for other factors. See Ian Ayres et al.,
Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J. ECON. 891, 910 (2015) (in baseball card auctions on eBay, cards
held by a black hand sell for less than cards held by a white hand); Nancy Leong, The Sharing
Economy Has a Race Problem, SALON (Nov. 2, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.salon.com/
2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_problem/ [http://perma.cc/3PAP-C5FT].
123. Jennifer Neeley, Is the Sharing Economy Feminist?, MEDIUM: ON-DEMAND (June 1,
2015),
https://medium.com/ondemand/is-the-sharing-economy-feminist-ea4ce5480c26
[http://perma.cc/ZZM2-L8YY] (from report by Etsy).
124. Id. It turns out that online sales platforms may also be sex-segregated.
125. For a critique of the choice argument, see Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place:
Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 802–03
(2001) (noting that “choice” includes “socially coerced choices, strategic choices, choices under
pressure, choices by people in subordinate positions, and choices within a limited range of
options”).
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world.126 Concerns about platform world thus emphasize that women tend to
“undersell themselves” by setting lower initial prices,127 are less likely to
negotiate, are more likely to be subject to consumer biases when they do
assert themselves, and are less likely to do well in platform negotiations.
b.

The Sources of Gender Disparities

In the studies that show the biggest gender disparities, the precise reasons
for the differences are difficult to ascertain. First, correlation is not causation,
and the gender differences were not always to women’s detriment. Second,
the studies attempted to control for factors such as worker experience,
customer reviews, and item quality, but the researchers did not interview the
participants. Moreover, they did not consider a variety of subtler factors that
may influence how platforms develop in the future.
In the eBay study, for example, gender differences did not appear to be a
function of the auction format per se, but rather differed substantially by
product. Male sellers made more than female sellers when selling products
such as new jewelry and watches or gift cards and coupons, while female
sellers earned more than the men when selling used toys and hobby goods or
pet supplies.128 The researchers could not explain the differences between
new and used goods other than to note that dramatically more of the goods
sold in eBay auctions are used, and that used goods are harder to value
(though the researchers tried to do so). They also speculated that the sale of
goods such as used toys or pet carriers may be more a matter of trust about
cleanliness and quality than price.129 The gender composition of eBay
purchasers may also have an effect; women are approximately 50% less
likely to be buyers.130 And while researchers found that on gig worker

126. Alexa Kissinger, Women & the Gig Economy: Flexibility in a Vacuum Just Isn’t
Enough, ON LABOR (May 27, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/05/27/women-the-gig-economyflexibility-in-a-vacuum-just-isnt-enough/ [http://perma.cc/VH7A-ECSE].
127. Barzilay & Ben-David, supra note 111, at 420.
128. The researchers also found that goods such as gift cards were valued differently in lab
experiments depending on whether they were associated with male or female sellers. KricheliKatz & Regev, supra note 118, at 4.
129. Id. The researchers speculated “that potential buyers trust women’s account of the
condition of used products more than they trust men’s—even when they enjoy the same reputation
on eBay,” but they could not directly test the validity of the proposition. Id.
130. Distribution of eBay Shoppers and Buyers in the United States as of 4th Quarter 2017,
by Gender, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/242479/ebay-us-shoppers-gender/
[http://perma.cc/KM2Q-ZJNW] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (finding that 61% of the buyers are
male).
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platforms women tended to set lower initial prices, in the eBay study, women
set higher starting prices than men did—but still received less.131
The fact that gender disparities varied by category, however, suggests that
factors other than gender bias per se may be at play. Consider gift cards. The
authors of the eBay study attempted to show the influence of gender bias by
running a lab experiment in which they showed their test subjects gift cards
being sold by a seller with a male name (Brad) versus a seller with a female
name (Alison), and then asked the subjects to estimate their value.132 The
subjects valued the gift cards associated with Brad at $87.42 in comparison
with Alison’s cards, which they valued at $83.34, even though the cards in
question were of identical value.133 This strongly suggests that differences in
the sale of gift cards, one of the categories that shows the greatest gender
differences, is a product of bias. But, an online search for “eBay gift cards”
leads to eBay community forums with repeated warnings about gift card
fraud.134 A second online search for the category with the biggest gender
differences—new jewelry and watches—also produces fraud warnings,
warning sellers of various buyer-initiated scams.135 The same factors that
make gift cards and new Bulova watches easy to study—their established
value and relatively high prices—also make the prices subject to substantial
manipulation and outright fraud.136

131. Kricheli-Katz & Regev, supra note 118, at 2. The researchers found that women overall
set lower prices, but that this occurred because they were selling cheaper products. Id. at 2. When
the researchers looked at men and women setting the same items, they found that women were
more likely to set higher initial prices. Id. Women were also more likely than the men to set a
“reserve price,” for which eBay charges a fee, suggesting that they were less confident than the
men that their goods would be sold, perhaps because their different experiences on eBay than
male sellers. Id. at 2–3.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id.
134. channjackso-0, Do Not Buy eBay Gift Cards! Scam Alert!, EBAY: THE EBAY
COMMUNITY (Feb. 24, 2018, 9:47 AM), https://community.ebay.com/t5/My-Account/Do-notbuy-ebay-gift-cards-Scam-alert/td-p/28162329 [http://perma.cc/MNC2-94LW] (last visited Jan.
13, 2019).
135. the_treasure_port, Sellers Beware!!! Especially if You Sell Jewelry . . ., EBAY: EBAY
COMMUNITY (July 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://community.ebay.com/t5/Archive-eBayCafe/Sellers-Beware-Especially-if-you-sell-jewelry/td-p/2686199 [http://perma.cc/87C3-9QGV]
(last visited Jan. 13, 2019); timeagainwatches, How to Make Sure You Are Buying an Authentic
Watch, EBAY: BUYING GUIDES (Apr. 12, 2009), https://www.ebay.com/gds/HOW-TO-MAKESURE-YOU-ARE-BUYING-AN-AUTHENTIC-WATCH-/10000000006353743/g.html
[http://perma.cc/ZRJ4-KTWW] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
136. Joseph M. Forgione, Counterfeiting, Couture, and the Decline of Consumer Trust in
Online Marketplace Platforms, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 195, 197 n.8 (2017) (indicating that as a
measure of the significance of the counterfeiting, “[w]atches and jewelry accounted for 47% of
the value of goods seized by Customs in 2016, a value of $653,590,442 had they been genuine”).
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This in turn affects the sellers likely to sell on eBay, a group who have
changed over time. On eBay generally, fraud is a major issue, experiencing
“explosive growth” since the development of the platform.137 This in turn
makes it riskier to sell on platforms such as eBay and could influence gender
disparities. First, the risk of counterfeiting increases the importance for sellers
of having reputable suppliers, which in turn intensifies the importance of
experience, expertise, and reliable networks.138 Yet, for example, the jewelry
business has been called “sexist,” making it more likely that male sellers will
have such connections and experience.139 Second, these risks increase the
importance of the platform being able to deal with buyers engaged in
fraudulent practices.140 Finally, there is the possibility that the men earning
more than women on eBay are themselves engaging in manipulative or
deceptive practices. While no studies exist documenting gender differences
in eBay fraud, studies in other contexts suggest that men are more likely than
women to engage in corporate fraud,141 and fraud against their employers or
customers.142 This makes the question of what causes gender differences in
platform world more complex.
In dealing with price differences in services, such as those on TaskRabbit,
fraud is less of an issue. Nonetheless, different pathways into platforms may
account for some of the differentials. Consider two workers with identical
137. See, e.g., NETNAMES, COUNTING THE COST OF COUNTERFEITING 4 (2015) (“In an
environment where counterfeiting is as profitable as illegal drugs . . . we are seeing explosive
growth. Expanding by over 15% every year, counterfeiting now costs more than 2% of total global
economic output, or around $1.8 trillion per year. There is little doubt as to the crucial role played
by the digital world in this meteoric rise, with a 15% increase in sales of counterfeit goods online
last year.”).
138. Aron Hsiao, Top Risks eBay Sellers Face, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/top-ten-risks-ebay-sellers-face-1140349
[http://perma.cc/383N-JLRG] (noting the problems associated with determining whether the
goods are counterfeit).
139. See, e.g., Andrea Cheng, How a Massive Gender Gap Is Hurting the Diamond Industry,
FASHIONISTA (Sept. 14, 2017), https://fashionista.com/2017/09/diamond-industry-gender-gap
[http://perma.cc/L9TE-4JMB] (“The industry itself is fundamentally sexist. It’s controlled by a
few key players whose families have been in the business for generations, all of which—you
guessed it—is run by men.”).
140. Tims, supra note 115 (noting accusations against eBay of failing to protect its sellers).
141. See Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Jennifer Schwartz & Michael Roche, Gender and TwentyFirst-Century Corporate Crime: Female Involvement and the Gender Gap in Enron-Era
Corporate Frauds, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 448, 469 (2013).
142. Joe Pye, Women Are More Honest Employees, Yet Still Are Paid Less, DEBT.COM (July
11,
2018),
https://www.debt.com/2018/men-likely-women-commit-fraud-work/
[http://perma.cc/CZ5D-YAHM]. Women are also more likely to be punished. Mark L. Egan,
Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing
Corporate Misconduct 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23242, 2018),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23242 [http://perma.cc/N69N-JH7Z].
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education and years of experience. One is a plumber, who would like to work
full time, but has had a falloff in customers. The other took time off after the
birth of a child. Both use TaskRabbit to pick up additional income in ways
that can accommodate their other responsibilities. In the case of the plumber
using platform world to supplement other income, the other plumbing
activities establish price expectations. The first plumber will not want
activities on platform world to undercut the price for non-platform plumbing
services, and if the difference in price is too great, the first plumber is likely
to look elsewhere for additional plumbing jobs. The second plumber will not
have other plumbing work as a base point for price expectations. Instead,
platform world is likely to be the only option to produce additional income
as a plumber, while also acting as a primary caretaker for the children. The
result may be that each of these two plumbers has a different “reservation
price” for participation in platform world.143 And these factors may affect a
wide swath of the gig workers in platform world. Men generally are more
likely to be doing side jobs than are women; that is, they were more likely to
be working a second job to add their income from a first job.144 And women
earn just more than a third of what men earn per month when they do side
jobs, in part because the men doing them are more likely than the women to
be experienced professionals.145 These disparities, which do not include the
differences in education or experience that most empirical studies control for,
could explain women’s tendency to set lower prices, given that women are
more likely to be turning to platform world because of its greater flexibility
and accommodation of family responsibilities. Is this speculative about
gendered traits? Yes. But it is not fundamentally different from the
speculation about the other roles gender plays in price differences.
Most empirical studies that find differences in price assume one of two
stories. The first is that women undersell themselves, although the story could
just as easily be told in terms of male narcissism, entitlement, or dominance
displays in negotiations.146 These authors suggest that women, perhaps
143. Reservation
Price,
NEGOTIATIONS,
https://www.negotiations.com/definition/
reservation-price/ [http://perma.cc/KMJ9-9VJ2] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
144. Lisa Rabasca Roepe, How Side Hustles Can Impact the Gender Pay Gap, FORBES (Apr.
24, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaroepe/2018/04/24/how-side-hustles-canimpact-the-gender-pay-gap/#7713be8178e7 [http://perma.cc/DH4M-X95A].
145. Fourteen percent of men, compared to 9% of women, are doing side work each week.
Amanda Dixon, The Average Side Hustler Earns Over $8K Annually, BANKRATE (June 25, 2018),
https://www.bankrate.com/personal-finance/smart-money/side-hustles-survey-june-2018/
[http://perma.cc/93ZG-5QT9]. The patterns may be somewhat different in Europe. See Jan
Drahokoupil & Agnieszka Piasna, Work in the Platform Economy: Beyond Lower Transaction
Costs, 52 INTERECONOMICS 335, 337–38 (2017), https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2017/6/
work-in-the-platform-economy-beyond-lower-transaction-costs/ [http://perma.cc/M9PH-AK7F].
146. See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 4, at 464–66.
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because of risk aversion or conflict avoidance, set lower prices to avoid
negotiations.147 The second, complementary story is that customer bias drives
the behavior, with customers’ undervaluing women’s services or reacting
more negatively to women than when they attempt to drive a hard bargain on
the same terms as men do.148 The alternative story developed in this Article
is not necessarily inconsistent with the gender traits (women are more risk
averse) or gender bias accounts. It suggests, however, that structural factors
may play at least as big a role in observed gender disparities. All studies show
that more experienced sellers and workers do better in platform world.149 And,
indeed, studies of gender-based risk aversion also show that gender
differences decline or disappear among professionals trained to manage
risk.150 The eBay study, however, does not and cannot control for experience
in dealing with fraud in jewelry or gift card sales,151 and the studies of worker
platforms do not fully control for participants’ experience in price setting out
of platform world, even if the study does control for education and experience
in the task.
What this means is that the sellers who sell on eBay may be far more
varied than any statistical study can capture, making gendered price
comparisons of uncertain value. The fact that female eBay sellers are more
likely to set reserve prices, for example, can involve both greater risk
avoidance and a realistic choice to protect against vulnerability to customer
bias. Both indicate adaptions to platform world over time. And one of the
things that has changed on eBay since the study was conducted is that there
is less information about sellers. Today, it would be harder to determine
gender than at the time the study was conducted. In a recent search for Bulova
watches, for example, the top dealer listed had a username of
“officialwatchdeals” and was listed as an “[o]fficial Bulova seller.”152

147. Barzilay & Ben-David, supra note 111, at 420–21 (noting that women tend to set lower
prices to avoid negotiations, and that “leaning in” has more negative consequences for women
than men); see also Kricheli-Katz & Regev, supra note 118, at 2, 7 (suggesting that women eBay
sellers are more risk averse than men and therefore more likely to use the “Buy It Now” option
with fixed prices rather than use the auction system).
148. Kricheli-Katz & Regev, supra note 118, at 6–7.
149. See e.g., id. at 4.
150. See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 4, at 462.
151. Nor does it control for other seller characteristics such as experience outside of eBay.
Kricheli-Katz & Regev, supra note 118, at 4.
152. Officialwatchdeals,
EBAY,
https://www.ebay.com/usr/officialwatchdeals
[https://perma.cc/N3ZR-A878] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
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Takeaways

What these results suggest is that the terms of platform world have yet to
be institutionalized. Informal economies across the globe build in greater
variation in the terms of sales and employment contracts than the
standardized arrangements of large institutions. They also offer more
opportunities for fraud, manipulation, and gender bias. Over time,
standardized prices might limit some of the gender disparities in platform
world, but more standard prices might also mean that the women who post
lower prices eventually lower the price for the men as well. And disguising
gender may solve problems associated with bias and harassment,153 but may
not eliminate gender differences in dealing with the risks associated with
unscrupulous practices.
The more important questions may become, as they are in platform world,
issues of access. Experience creates greater ability to deal with fraud on eBay,
price expectations on TaskRabbit, and gender bias in customer expectations.
One of the advantages of platform world has been its relatively few barriers
to entry, but the more that experience is necessary to counter its gendered
effects, the less open it may become.
B. Shooting Someone on Fifth Avenue and Getting Away with It154:
Safety Concerns
“‘They make us drive to these really unsafe zones,’” reported one
female driver who works for a grocery delivery company.155

With its celebration of “disruption,” platform world often emphasizes its
disdain for the traditional standards and regulation that apply to traditional
industries. eBay first gained attention through its use of an auction format
that eschewed fixed prices. Airbnb and Uber originally came into existence
ignoring the regulations—for better and ill—that govern taxi companies and
hotels.156 As courts, legislatures, and platform creators respond, the platforms
153. See Schoenbaum, supra note 109.
154. Jeremy Diamond, Trump: I Could ‘Shoot Somebody and I Wouldn’t Lose Voters,’ CNN:
POLITICS (Jan. 24, 2016, 12:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/23/politics/donald-trumpshoot-somebody-support/index.html [https://perma.cc/W26H-J5Z6].
155. Sam Levin, Sexual Harassment and The Sharing Economy: The Dark Side of Working
for Strangers, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2017/aug/23/sexual-harassment-sharing-economy-uber-doordash-airbnb-twitter
[https://perma.cc/7CXT-ZHEZ].
156. These protections involve insurance to cover accountability for passenger safety and a
variety of other issues accidents. Andrew J. Yawn, Uber v. Taxis: What’s the Difference?,
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change, ironing out insurance requirements in some cases, or addressing
scammers in others. Overall, however, the platform exchanges remain less
regulated than the traditional economy, creating new opportunities for the
ambitious and the unscrupulous. And the lack of regulation—or simply
ordinarily policing—can make platforms more dangerous, particularly for
women.
Unsafeness in the platform operates both virtually and physically. As the
previous sections have demonstrated, women are not protected from negative
reviews or differential pricing, and in some cases, outright fraud. Moreover,
women are vulnerable to online harassment. Finally, women experience
physical and sexual vulnerability as both workers and customers, particularly
where the work takes place in someone else’s home or requires interactions
with customers in cars or other unprotected places.157
Women report that customers grab their breasts and send them
pornographic texts and pictures; harassment goes unpoliced.158 HoneyBook,
a popular online platform for freelancers who work in event planning,
surveyed its users. While not a scientific study, the findings show that more
than half of the workers had been harassed at least once; some had been called
demeaning nicknames, some had been physically intimidated, and most had
received “unprofessional comments” on their appearance.159
Women, of course, also face such challenges in traditional employment. It
is thus important to consider what is different—and what isn’t—in platform
world. First, platform world rarely involves standardized workplaces.160
Craigslist sellers who are based at home incur greater risks than sellers in
antique stores. Second, platforms connect workers with the public. On the
one hand, the apps often allow greater screening than might otherwise occur.
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:31 PM), https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/
story/news/2016/01/21/uber-vs-taxicabs-whats-difference/79132286/ [https://perma.cc/VMN7L8WC].
157. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1044.
158. Elizabeth King, How Freelancers Are Forced to Fend for Themselves Against Sexual
Harassment, BROADLY (Nov. 2, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/
en_us/article/vb4m73/how-freelancers-are-forced-to-fend-for-themselves-against-sexualharassment [https://perma.cc/YLF3-PL9B]; Levin, supra note 155.
159. Nathan Heller, The Gig Economy Is Especially Susceptible to Sexual Harassment, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-gigeconomy-is-especially-susceptible-to-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/R6ED-RRXX];
Sexual Harassment Is Pervasive Among Self-Employed Creatives, HONEYBOOK (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.honeybook.com/risingtide/sexual-harassment-report/
[https://perma.cc/83UXWNU9].
160. EUR. AGENCY FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, A REVIEW ON THE FUTURE OF WORK:
ONLINE LABOUR EXCHANGES, OR ‘CROWDSOURCING’: IMPLICATIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH 2–3 (2015), https://osha.europa.eu/en/tools-andpublications/publications/futurework-crowdsourcing [https://perma.cc/M3CT-7LUV].
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On the other hand, they may provide less training and standardized
protection. Consider ride sharing platforms. Taxi driving is one of the most
dangerous jobs, and the industry has historically had few women drivers.161
Ride sharing programs have attracted more women, and they allow their
drivers to avoid bar districts or time periods such as 2 a.m. that produce more
drunken or rowdy passengers. In addition, platform drivers, unlike taxi
drivers, do not carry cash and the customer ratings that are part of the ride
sharing apps allow them to identify—and exclude—troublesome riders more
easily than a driver picking up customers who hail them on the street.
Nonetheless, the platforms provide less in the way of safety training or
vehicle safety features such as grilles separating drivers and passengers than
cab companies.162 And Uber incentives discourage ride cancellation, limiting
the drivers’ ability to screen potential customers on the basis of their
individual characteristics.163 Some entrepreneurs have looked into the
possibility of starting a women only ride-sharing company—with women
drivers picking up only women customers for reasons related to safety and
comfort to address the issue.164
161. Molly McHugh, Uber and Lyft Drivers Work Dangerous Jobs—But They’re on Their
Own, WIRED (Mar. 10, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/uber-lyft-can-muchkeep-drivers-safe/ [https://perma.cc/M57U-T7ZR]. On the percentage of women, see supra notes
79–81 and accompanying text.
162. See McHugh, supra note 161.
163. See, e.g., Can Uber Drivers Get Deactivated for Cancelling Too Many Rides?,
MAXIMUM RIDESHARING PROFITS, https://maximumridesharingprofits.com/can-uber-drivers-getdeactivated-canceling-many-rides/ [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=20275] (last visited
Mar. 1, 2019) (“You can’t get deactivated for acceptance rate requirements, but you can get
deactivated for canceling too many rides. Your cancellation rate is determined by Uber: They take
the number of trips that you canceled, divided by the number of trips that you accept.”); see also
Julie Wehmeyer, Ten Reasons That Your Uber/Lyft Driver Cancels on You, LINKEDIN (Feb. 23,
2017),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ten-reasons-your-uberlyft-driver-cancels-you-juliewehmeyer/ [https://perma.cc/5RVV-VTEK].
Uber explains, on the passenger side:
All ride requests are blindly matched with the nearest available driver. So there
is no discrimination based on race, gender, or destination.
Driver profiles
When you’re matched with a driver, you’ll see their name, license plate
number, photo, and rating—so you know who’s picking you up ahead of time.
And even after the trip, you’re able to contact your driver if you left something
behind.
From Start to Finish, A Ride You Can Trust, UBER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.uber.com/enTR/blog/safety-4/ [https://perma.cc/EVA3-4YRP].
164. See Rebecca Gale, When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender
Discrimination, SLATE (July 3, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-
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Safety concerns may also affect women’s performance in other ways. One
factor in the Uber gender discrimination study was men’s tendency to drive
faster, allowing them to pick up more rides in a given time period; 165 Uber
rewards drivers who carry more customers farther in a given amount of
time.166 To the extent faster driving is an advantage, making the fact apparent
to female drivers or giving them more training might eliminate the disparity.
But platform operators like Uber might have a different motive. On the one
hand, they may not wish to explicitly encourage their drivers to speed, for
fear of incurring greater liability. On the other hand, Uber may, as a practical
matter, be benefitting from risk-taking drivers without accepting
responsibility for the results. In this case, gender disparities may be
associated with an avoidable increase in safety risks and deserve to be
addressed on that ground, perhaps through tort liability, not
antidiscrimination law.
Some of the disparities arise from platform world’s ability to evade the
legal obligations that ordinarily arise from the employment relationship and
tort liability more generally.
C. Gendered Work Patterns
By the height of the manufacturing age, the state had built support for
families and communities in large part through the structure of employment.
These supports, which included the regulation of wages and hours,
subsidization through the tax system of Medicare, retirement contributions
and other benefits, employer mandates to provide paid disability
accommodations, and discrimination protections, contributed to family
security and the standardization of full-time employment.167
The platform economy eliminates much of the standardizations and the
subsidization that contributed to family and community stability. While the
platform economy’s greater flexibility and lower barriers to entry help many,

are-suing-womens-empowerment-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/DJP2-T257].
165. Cook et al., supra note 9, at 3.
166. Stephen J. Dubner, What Can Uber Teach Us About the Gender Pay Gap?,
FREAKONOMICS (Feb. 6, 2018, 11:59 AM), http://freakonomics.com/podcast/what-can-uberteach-us-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/RZ3C-HW2H].
167. Although that standardization often worked to the disadvantage of women with children
and others who preferred more flexible arrangements, the system itself did not discriminate
explicitly.
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men and women’s typical work patterns are still replicated because of
fundamental differences in familial demands.168
For example, the same study of Uber that found that men earned more
because they drove faster also found that men earned more because of their
choices over where and when to drive. Men were more likely to take
advantage of surge pricing rates, even if the times were less convenient of the
places were father away. Some of these differences may involve motivation;
men may have cared more about the extra cash than the women did. But the
differences were also likely to involve women’s greater family
responsibilities, which may have interfered with their ability to drive during
rush hour, for example.
More generally, men and women participate in platform world in different
ways. As noted above, men are more likely to use platform world to
supplement other employment, while women were more likely to use
platform jobs as their sole source of income.169 And women earn just more
than a third of what men earn per month when they do side jobs, in part
because the men doing them are more likely than the women to be
experienced professionals.170 This may contribute to women’s tendency to
charge less than men, even for the same jobs, and it may determine the type
of jobs they seek.
Nonetheless, the differences may be less than in bricks-and-mortar world.
The platform world reduces the privileges that are associated with the ability
to be an “ideal-worker” with a stay at home spouse.171 The promotion ladders
as an Uber driver or Etsy seller are limited, although, as in a bricks-andmortar world, the ability to work long hours is associated with more money.172
The larger impact of platform world, however, may come from its overall
effect on the labor market and worker protections. Platforms like Uber,
TaskRabbit and others increase the labor supply by tapping into people who
would like to work more hours. The net effect, as an economist would predict,
ought to be to increase the labor supply and lower the price of that labor.
Moreover, these workers bear the costs of illness, health insurance, and
168. See Marianne Bertrand, The Glass Ceiling 14–15 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ. at
U.
Chi.,
Working
Paper
No.
2018-38,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3191467 [https://perma.cc/TJ6H-UL5V] (noting that the difference in
home schedules helps explain why women are underrepresented at the upper levels of the earning
curve).
169. See Roepe, supra note 144.
170. See Dixon, supra note 145.
171. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 103 (2010).
172. Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REV.
1091, 1110 (2014).
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retirement savings entirely on their own. The platform economy does not
offer its gig workers benefits such as health insurance nor are the businesses
subject to mandates such as family leave.173
This lack of benefits may affect men and women differently depending on
their marital status. The lack of health insurance, for example, may not be a
concern for workers who have a partner with a family health insurance plan.
Nonetheless, the spread of platform world increases the number of workers
who will need health insurance from another source, and who are not
receiving the public benefits available to employees, such as unemployment
insurance. Workers dependent on their platform economy income may feel
pressure to work longer or less convenient hours to compensate for the
absence of a social safety net. The platform companies have faced some
pressure to create better workplaces that provide benefits beyond flexibility.
If they don’t do so, the government could step in to offer workers the health
care and pensions they need.174 As for the gig workers themselves, those with
marketable skills will move on, either into management or into other jobs
altogether. But overall, “advantaged people still end up leveraging their
advantages.”175
The net result is likely to have three effects: 1) an increase in overall
inequality as platform creators join the ranks of the wealthy; 2) an increased
in the gendered wage gap at the top of the economy as men remain more
likely to get and retain competitive full-time jobs with benefits; and 3) a
decrease in the gendered wage in the bottom half of the economy as men’s
employment become more precarious. Nonetheless, as platform world moves
from experimental to mature, gender differences may diminish—or
accelerate.

173. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2018) (If
workers are classified as employees, and not independent contractors, “the hiring business bears
the responsibility of paying federal Social Security and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance
taxes and state employment taxes, providing worker’s compensation insurance,
and . . . complying with numerous state and federal statutes and regulations governing the wages,
hours, and working conditions of employees.”).
174. Uber offers various discounts, for example, on phones and health plans. In the United
Kingdom, it gives sick days and maternity benefits. Margi Murphy, Uber Bows to Pressure by
Giving Drivers Sick Leave and Maternity Pay, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/05/23/uber-bows-pressure-giving-drivers-sickleave-maternity-pay/ [https://perma.cc/L6CM-7S9B].
175. Nathan Heller, Is the Gig Economy Working, NEW YORKER (May 15, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/is-the-gig-economy-working
[https://perma.cc/EED5-K8PT].
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D. Funding and Silicon Valley’s Bro Club
The biggest gender differences in platform world involve platform owners
and creators rather than workers.176 First, there are few female engineers
developing the algorithms in the first place;177 the environments in which
these programs are generated are “chilly” to women, albeit in subtle ways
that may fall outside conventional employment discrimination laws. So too
may the quite apparent gendered consequences of platform world addressed
in the next section.
Second, venture capital overwhelmingly funds male-run companies; only
2.7% of VC-backed companies had a female CEO.178 Venture capital funding
itself is widely seen as a young boys club in which personal relationships and
networking are seen as the key to success.179 Moreover, studies of the VC
process indicate that women performing the same entrepreneurial pitch as
men received considerably worse evaluations by professional investors than
their otherwise identical male counterparts.180
Third, although women have not shied away from entrepreneurship and
women-owned businesses grew 68% between 1997 and 2014, 181 the
amount of money going to women-owned firms has not increased
proportionally with the rise in the numbers of such firms. 182 Consider
crowdfunding, which typically raises funds from a large number of small
investors over the Internet, thereby attempting to democratize the funding
176. Employees, perhaps to a greater extent than the gig workers, also face a gendered and
racist environment. E.g., Mike Isaac & Katie Benner, At Uber, New Questions Arise About
Executive Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/
technology/uber-barney-harford-behavior.html [https://perma.cc/KY7Z-Z87T].
177. See Alison T. Wynn & Shelley J. Correll, Puncturing the Pipeline: Do Technology
Companies Alienate Women in Recruiting Sessions?, 48 SOC. STUD. SCI. 149, 154 (2018).
178. CANDIDA BRUSH ET AL., DIANA REPORT—WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS 2014: BRIDGING
THE GENDER GAP IN VENTURE CAPITAL 7 (2014), http://www.babson.edu/media/babson/siteassets/content-assets/about/academics/centres-and-institutes/blank-institute/global-research/
diana-project/diana-project-executive-summary-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FHN-MTGQ].
179. Venture capital is overwhelmingly white and male, and 40% of investors have attended
Harvard or Stanford. Richard Kerby, Where Did You Go to School?, NOTEWORTHY: J. BLOG (July
30, 2018), https://blog.usejournal.com/where-did-you-go-to-school-bde54d846188?stream=top
[https://perma.cc/D6L2-TQF9].
180. Jason Greenberg & Ethan Mollick, Leaning In or Leaning On? Gender, Homophily, and
Activism in Crowdfunding 8 (Wharton U. Pa. Scholarly Commons, Management Paper No. 189,
2015), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=mgmt_papers
[https://perma.cc/9FRF-SHQV].
181. Samantha Zabell, This Crowdfunding Platform Will Change the Way Women Raise
Money, REAL SIMPLE, https://www.realsimple.com/work-life/life-strategies/inspirationmotivation/karen-cahn-ifundwomen [https://perma.cc/2ELE-FCUY] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
182. Lexie Carmon, Closing the Gender Gap: Women Founders Win on Crowdfunding
Platforms, CNBC (July 20, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/why-women-join-thecrowd-gender-gap-in-bank-lending-vc-funds-narrow.html [https://perma.cc/2TLR-VXJU].
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process.183 By soliciting money through online platforms, women can bypass
the personal networks that dominate Silicon Valley, and they pitch their
companies through impersonal online presentations designed to showcase
their strengths—or at least diffuse bias.184
And in fact women are more successful than men in securing
crowdfunding. Although the percentage of overall funds they receive remains
under 10%, women founders on Kickstarter enjoyed “40% greater odds of a
successful funding raise, net of other factors.”185 The reason, in part, is that
many women funders, who do not ordinarily fund tech projects, do so when
women pitch the projects.186 Nonetheless, women are more reluctant than
men to participate in these ventures at all, particularly if they are not entirely
confident of their product.187
The source of these differences in pursuing engineering, becoming venture
capitalists, or starting a crowdfunding effort is unclear.188 They may
correspond to women’s socialization into subordinate roles in which they are
expected to care for others. They may also reflect gender-based differences
in hormonal development. Or they may reflect women’s greater wariness
about online or commercial transactions more generally.189 In any case, this
gendered behavior assumes disproportionate importance in an economy that
attempts to match preferences, traits, and patterns without examining their
sources.
***
183. What Is Crowdfunding?, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn/resources/guides/
crowdfunding-guide/what-is-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/N4TN-TYNU] (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
184. Greenberg & Mollick, supra note 180, at 14–15 (indicating that in at least 70% of
projects on Kickstarter, it is possible to tell the gender of the founder even if a picture or full name
is not present).
185. Id. at 23.
186. Id. at 23–25 (male funders do not show similar differences, for either men or women).
187. In the somewhat analogous situation of women applying for jobs, a study at Hewlett
Packard showed that “[m]en apply for a job when they meet only 60% of the qualifications, but
women apply only if they meet 100% of them.” Mohr, supra note 70.
188. We take no position on whether there might be some innate tendencies toward particular
responses or whether these traits are the product of a millennia of social teachings, because it is
most likely a combination of both. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, TESTOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX, SCIENCE, AND
SOCIETY 86–87, 107 (2017) (demonstrating that patterns of behavioral characteristics depend on
a mosaic of factors and circumstances other than genetic and hormonal factors determined by
sex); Coren Apicella & Johanna Mollerstrom, Women Do Like to Compete—Against
Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/opinion/sunday/
women-do-like-to-compete-against-themselves.html [https://perma.cc/7UT4-4SHA] (reviewing
a study that found women are just as competitive as men when they were “choosing to compete
against their own past performance”); see Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 4, at 486.
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The question of whether platform world is oppressive or liberating
depends on what happens next—to the workers, other participants, and the
economy. Some gig workers may use online platforms to gain needed
experiences before they go off on their own; they might seek to become an
independent contractor who moves from small jobs on TaskRabbit to
building homes or taking on major remodels.190 Other women may wish to
return to full-time conventional employment once their children start school.
But many workers may find that they are stuck. Online platforms may bid
down the prices that once went to independent construction workers, and the
full-time jobs for those whose children have grown may no longer be there.191
IV.

THE LAWS AROUND PLATFORM WORLD

“Antidiscrimination law [has] historically had two components: a moral
one—discrimination is wrong—and a structural one that sought to promote
equality for workers collectively . . . .”192 Both components were particularly
effective in targeting the large employers who dominated the manufacturing
era. These employers provided “good” jobs that offered career ladders with
secure employment, regular raises, and opportunities for advancement. They
also standardized working conditions and wages. It was easy to tell if the
female worker on the assembly line was paid less for the same work than the
male worker.
The legal and economic infrastructure in which this approach flourished
is gone, along with the good jobs that offered security and provided benefits,
and the standardized work conditions that facilitated the development of

190. Diane Mulcahy, Who Wins in the Gig Economy, and Who Loses, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
27,
2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/10/who-wins-in-the-gig-economy-and-who-loses
[https://perma.cc/7ZZY-9PCX].
191. See id.
192. Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 4, at 486. Lawrence Lessig warned, almost two
decades ago, that
[t]he threats to values implicit in the law—threats raised by changes in the
architecture of code—are just particular examples of a more general point: that
more than law alone enables legal values, and law alone cannot guarantee
them. If our objective is a world constituted by these values, then it is as much
these other regulators—code, but also norms and the market—that must be
addressed.
Lessig, supra note 11, at 548–49.
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traditional employment discrimination law.193 In platform world, in contrast,
access is rarely the issue; the whole point of online apps is to facilitate access.
While women may not necessarily be first movers in the adoption of new
technology, and while they may not be equally represented on crowdfunding
sites or on eBay, there are no formal barriers keeping them out, and their
representation is often higher than in the bricks-and-mortar analog.
Moreover, as the Article indicated above, a large part of what the apps do is
to eliminate the standardization of bricks-and-mortar world and the midlevel
supervisors who oversaw the system.194 As a practical matter, this means both
the mechanisms of antidiscrimination law, such as class actions against large
employers and their substantive standards, are practically meaningless.195
Other scholars have taken two distinct approaches: finding that the laws
are inadequate and difficult to adapt—or that the laws can be adapted, based
on their specific statutory or doctrinal constraints. Our approach is that both
of these positions are accurate. Existing laws already prohibit some forms of
sex discrimination,196 and they can be adapted to prohibit other forms, but
those steps are inadequate to address the larger problems that produce sex
disparities in the gig economy. It is virtually impossible for traditional
antidiscrimination laws to apply where success involves equal access to
insecure gigs that may last no longer than a few hours, or equal pay for work
in a context where wages and prices fluctuate on what may be a daily basis.
Traditional laws were not created with gigs in mind, and apply only
awkwardly to algorithms; in addition, cramped legal interpretations limit both
their applicability and their usefulness for platform world.
This Part reviews existing laws applicable to bricks-and-mortar
relationships—and finds them wanting as correctives for disparities in
platform world.

193. See, e.g., Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 4, at 433–34, 440–42; see also Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745–48 (2011) (providing a
brief history of Title detailing the rise of the “comparator” methodology and arguing against
courts’ reliance on these evaluative devices); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465 (2001) (detailing the stages
of employment discrimination law).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 25–33.
195. The various disparities would, however, appear to implicate a number of different laws,
including those relating to public accommodations, employment discrimination, and
communications decency. The first three are discussed in Datta et al., supra note 63, at 102–06
but only in the context of targeted ads. Similarly, Schoenbaum questioned whether employment,
housing, and public accommodations laws apply to the gig economy. Schoenbaum, supra note 2,
at 1058–60.
196. E.g., Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. C15-1483JLR, 2016 WL 4472930, at *8–12
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2016).
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A. Employment Discrimination
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act provide the most obvious source of
addressing disparities.197 The Equal Pay Act requires equal pay for similar
work; for example, issues of under- and over-pricing would be handled
through an Equal Pay Act case against an employer who paid men and women
differently for substantially similar work.198
1.

The Laws

Title VII protects against additional gender-based disparities. At its most
basic level, Title VII bans explicit barriers to hiring. Thus, the first U.S.
Supreme Court case to interpret Title VII ruled that the law prohibited a sexbased classification that prohibited hiring mothers (though not fathers) with
pre-school age children,199 and a subsequent case upheld a prohibition on
male and female want ads against a First Amendment challenge.200 Yet when
it came to different treatment based on what it deemed individual employee
choice—such as becoming pregnant—the Court rejected efforts to consider
this as a form of discrimination.201 The Supreme Court did not view individual
choices as a structural obstacle to women’s workplace access of a kind with
the types of barriers Congress intended Title VII to address.202
Nonetheless, once employers moved away from explicitly race- or sexbased classifications, the courts struggled with the question of what proof
would establish discriminatory intent. In doing so a primary focus was
securing access to what had historically been all white or all male “good
jobs.”
197. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 2, at 675.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018).
199. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–47 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (describing the policy as an explicit gender-based classification).
200. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391
(1973) (upholding prohibitions of sex-segregated help-wanted advertisements in the face of a First
Amendment challenge).
201. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136, 145–46 (1976), superseded
by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
202. Id. At the time Title VII was passed, only 30% of married mothers with children under
the age of eighteen were in the labor force. Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Force
Participation of Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Feb. 2007, at 9–10,
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ6Z-94RD]. The big
increases in women’s labor force participation would become between 1980 and 2000. Id. at 10.
Since then, there has been much greater commitment to women’s workplace inclusion, and
recognition that full inclusion of women in the workplace requires treating pregnancy and family
responsibilities as matter of workplace structure. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER
90–91 (2000).
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In individual cases alleging disparate treatment, the Supreme Court
established a burden-shifting framework that required a “comparator.”203 In
these cases, courts allowed plaintiffs to prove discrimination where they
otherwise lacked sufficient direct evidence of bias by establishing unequal
treatment between two employees, creating an inference of discrimination if
the employer treated the member of the protected class, such as a woman,
less favorably than the employer treated a comparably situated male
employee.204
Disparate impact law is the second means the Supreme Court developed
for addressing the subtler forms of discrimination. Disparate impact analysis
differs from disparate treatment cases in that given sufficient proof that an
employment practice has a disparate impact on a suspected class, no proof of
discriminatory intent is necessary.205 It is this second form of discrimination
on which platform economy scholars have seized.206 The Supreme Court
initially set out the elements of disparate impact doctrine in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.207 During the fifties, the company imposed a high school degree
requirement for assignment to the company’s better-paid positions, and after
Title VII became effective, it required those seeking employment or transfers
to pass two written examinations.208 Only one of the African-Americans in a
position to seek reassignment was a high school graduate and whites
generally outperformed African-Americans on the tests by three to one.209 A
unanimous Supreme Court found the tests to be discriminatory, and the case
set the paradigm for a successful disparate impact suit. Feminists and other
antidiscrimination scholars have argued for an expansion of disparate impact
theory to reach a variety of employment practices that have a differential
impact on protected groups.210 This has been difficult, as Mike Selmi
explains, because the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact approach
“to deal with specific practices, seniority systems and written tests, that were
perpetuating past intentional discrimination” and that “the reality has been
that the theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to written
examinations.”211

203. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
204. Goldberg, supra note 193, at 745–46.
205. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 705–06 (2006).
206. E.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 2, at 701.
207. 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).
208. Id. at 427–28.
209. Id. at 427 n.2, 430 n.6.
210. Selmi, supra note 205, at 704–05.
211. Id. at 705.
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The Supreme Court has extended disparate impact theory outside of the
employment discrimination context to reach housing discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act.212
2.

The Problems with These Laws

While these laws would certainly cover the failure to hire a software
engineer because she was a woman, or a gender pay differential based solely
on sex, they otherwise have little relevance to platform world. One major
problem is that these laws only cover employers and employees, and most of
the transactions in platform world occur outside of traditional workplaces.
Moreover, disparate treatment theory under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
both require comparators who are treated differently;213 what platform world
does is customize every job and perhaps even every employment relationship,
making equal pay analysis meaningless.
First, for the platform world, the employment discrimination issue that has
received the most scholarly attention214 is whether workers are employees.
Bills have been introduced into at numerous state legislatures that would keep
the status quo, under which platform workers are not employees.215 The issue
is still working its way through the legal system, with most courts finding
that they are not employees, but a 2018 California decision suggesting
otherwise.216 Nonetheless, even if Title VII covers ride-sharing drivers, it
does not cover independent contractors on TaskRabbit, sellers on eBay, or
even the customers themselves.

212. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2525 (2015).
213. Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 641 (2018).
214. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to
Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 480–81 (2016).
215. Id. at 481.
216. Id. at 481–82. But see O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1135–36
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (describing proposed but rejected settlement of claims that Uber misclassified
drivers as independent contractors to avoid paying business expenses: In the Settlement
Agreement, “Uber has agreed to pay $84 million, plus an additional $16 million contingent on an
initial public offering (IPO) reaching one-and-a-half times Uber’s most recent valuation (i.e.,
about $93.75 billion)”); Warren, supra note 37 (discussing the loss of benefits, stability, and
collective power). One California court ruled delivery drivers may be employees; another ruled
that Grubhub drivers are not. Compare Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1093
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018) (finding that Grubhub drivers are not employees), with Dynamex
Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 41–42 (Cal. 2018) (finding that delivery drivers
could be considered employees for purposes of class certification). See also Lobel, supra note 21,
at 63–64 (proposing that the employment discrimination laws should apply to all workers,
regardless of their classification as independent contractors or employees).
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Second, Title VII works well with large organizations that have numerous
employees doing roughly the same thing for the same (or what should be the
same) pay. It never had much impact on either small employers or workplaces
where every employee has a different set of responsibilities. Because
platform world customizes every job and perhaps even every work
relationship, this renders an Equal Pay or Title VII comparator analysis
meaningless. Even if disparate impact remained a viable theory, it would still
fail when asserted by independent contractors.217 And even if platforms like
Uber were considered to be employers, proof of discrimination would
presumably require something more than a 7% difference in wages due to the
fact that male employees drove faster or were more willing to work during
peak pricing hours.
B. Additional Sources? Public Accommodations, Anti-Stalking, and
Criminal Laws
The federal public accommodations law, by its terms, only covers
discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin—not sex
discrimination—and applies only to hotels, gas stations, restaurants, and
entertainment venues, such as theaters and sports arenas.218 And individual
states have similarly limited contours in their individual statutes.219 While
there is some favorable precedent under the California state accommodations
statute for considering web platforms as “business establishments,”220 that
Act is limited to intentional discrimination and will not reach claims of
disparate impact.221
While numerous criminal laws touch on other behaviors occurring in
platform world, almost all of these laws were developed for a bricks-andmortar world and reach only inexactly, if at all, to internet activity. For
instance, a federal statute prohibits posting threats to people or stalking them
online.222 However, even assuming the online activity is traceable (which is
highly difficult to prove), the statute only reaches extreme instances. For
example, federal law prohibits a course of conduct that places a person “in
reasonable fear of . . . death . . . or serious bodily injury,” or that “would be
217. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REV. 239, 256 (1997).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2018).
219. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2018).
220. Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
221. Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425
(9th Cir. 2014).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018).
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reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress.”223 In a case that
is emblematic of the current anemic application of these laws, United States
v. Cassidy,224 the cyberstalking occurred through blog posts and hundreds of
Tweets. The court demonstrated an absence of understanding of the purpose
of the Act and even less comprehension of how emotional distress occurs
when it suggested that the victim “had the ability to protect her ‘own
sensibilities simply by averting’ her eyes from the Defendant’s Blog and not
looking at, or blocking his Tweets.”225 Cyberbullying statutes are equally
unhelpful. Most protect only minors, and assume that the perpetrator is a
minor as well.226 Moving online makes much of the activity anonymous. The
anonymity both empowers perpetrators and makes enforcement
extraordinarily difficult.
In short, these laws were intended to deal with a different world: the laws
that were created in the 1960s and 1970s never envisioned an economy in
which employment relationships were premised on individual gigs, with a
great degree of worker autonomy. They were not developed at a time when
anyone could envision algorithms controlling relationships. Thus, the major
laws that might apply to discriminatory practices are significantly limited in
their abilities to stretch to reach conduct in platform world. No laws require
that men and women performing the same gig services be paid the same. 227
And even outside of the gig economy, there is little protection against
customer discrimination.228 So reviewers can leave whatever reviews they
want as often as they’d like, even if it means that women receive fewer
reviews or that individuals habitually rate women as less competent than men.
The structure—or lack of structure—of the gig allows the discrimination to
continue. The vaunted flexibility of platform gig jobs ironically works against
extending antidiscrimination law in anything like its current form.
V.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PLATFORM WORLD: GENDERED SPACES AND
SUSPECT PRACTICES

If traditional antidiscrimination law is ill-conceived to address women’s
needs in platform world, what alternatives exist? We have emphasized in this
223. Id.
224. 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (D. Md. 2011).
225. Id. at 585.
226. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2709(a.1) (2018) (protecting against “cyber harassment
of a child” and prescribing penalties for juveniles who violate the statute).
227. By contrast, the Equal Pay Act requires employers to pay men and women who are
performing substantially similar jobs requiring “equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions” equal wages. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2018).
228. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 87, at 240.
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Article that it is difficult to know, in most cases, what the sources of gender
disparities are—much less to conclude that they necessarily reflect either
conscious hostility toward, or unconscious bias against, women. Indeed,
where the disparities create the greatest concern, they may not necessarily be
connected to discrimination at all. Instead, they may involve factors such as
the manipulation of eBay auctions or gender differences in family
responsibilities, concerns that differ from the traditional issues in
antidiscrimination law.
To deal with this new environment requires the following two overarching
approaches. The first requires redefining equality in platform world. At
present, the major advances are coming from private action. Lyft, for
example, is attempting to recruit more women drivers to compete with Uber.
The first section examines how to create environments in which gender
equity prompts corrective actions. The second requires reexamining labor in
the context of platform world more generally. This section takes up each of
these issues in turn.
A. Redefining Equality in Platform World
In the manufacturing era, antidiscrimination law defined equality as the
elimination of the gender and race-based barriers to jobs that provided
employment security and pathways to advancement. In platform world, few
jobs offer that same security and opportunity for promotion. Consequently,
equality needs to be redefined in terms of access not so much to the platforms
as to the resources necessary to succeed within them. Doing so requires a
focus on the legal infrastructure for platform world. That infrastructure
should depend less on antidiscrimination provisions than on more general
regulatory measures that prompt greater accountability and worker
protection.
1.

Reporting Requirements Are Critical

As this Article indicates, the data establishing the cause and consequences
of gender disparities is at a preliminary stage. Where gender disparities exist,
however, they have sometimes prompted action. These changes have
occurred for three distinct reasons that hold promise for further reform of
platform world.
First, women matter. They have clout as participants, customers, and
voters. Moreover, the idea of gender equality matters, both to women and to
platform creators. And there are market niches where women can influence
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developments. See Uber’s competitors.229 Moving forward might then
involve a duty to keep track of the disparities, and investigate their causes,
with transparent results.230 Once this information is available, then decisions
not to address the causes of the disparities where the causes involve otherwise
illegitimate practices or easily fixable ones, then the platforms should be seen
as assuming responsibility for the results.
Second, women are the canaries in the mine. Where gender disparities
exist, they almost always indicate issues worth exploring further. For
example, while eBay likes to publicize its efforts to combat internet fraud, it
publicizes relatively few statistics about that fraud.231 These issues may affect
gender disparities, but without data that connects gender issues and other
issues, it is impossible to know.
Third, Silicon Valley algorithms and apps provide solutions perhaps even
more than problems. Lyft, for example, is attempting to use targeted ads to
increase its percentage of women drivers.232 With greater information and
public pressure, platform world might solve a number of the issues raised in
this Article.
Thus, while reporting should be legally required, that requirement need
not be tied to other legally mandated actions. Accordingly, we propose new
regulations that would require platform companies to keep track of and report
such disparities.233 Such an obligation should not be tied to legal definitions
of employment nor even discrimination but rather to the dollar volume
generation in connection with the platform.234 The current lack of regulation
means there is no monitoring, no reporting requirements concerning the
creation, existence, or cause of gender disparities.
229. See, e.g., Patrick Sisson, Safr, a Female-Friendly Uber Alternative Launches with
Mission to Empower Women, CURBED (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.curbed.com/2017/4/5/
15195806/uber-safr-ridehailing-for-women [https://perma.cc/N52W-YCYV].
230. Other countries have imposed various reporting obligations on gender disparities. E.g.,
Gender Pay Gap Reporting: Overview, GOV.UK (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/gender-pay-gap-reporting-overview [https://perma.cc/63X6-2K7X] (noting employers
in the United Kingdom who have “250 or more employees must publish and report specific figures
about their gender pay gap”).
231. Tims, supra note 115.
232. Taxi Drivers & Chauffeurs, supra note 79.
233. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has recognized that eradication of
identity-group based disparities begins with monitoring. It is precisely this premise of knowledge
acquisition that underlies employer requirements to collect and report EEO-1 data. Agency
Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review, Final Comment
Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 81 Fed. Reg. 45,479, 45,479
(July 14, 2016). We are suggesting an extension of this practice to platform world.
234. Compare this assertion with Lessig, supra note 11, at 535 (“Government, I have
claimed, can influence the design of cyberspace in ways that enhance government’s ability to
regulate.”).
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Establishing Unacceptable Practices

Platform world, which prides itself on open access, involves little express
discrimination on the basis of race or sex. Nonetheless, platforms do create
gender-identified spaces. For example, eBay tends to involve more men than
women, with women constituting only 23% of eBay sellers in the data that
became available in 2014.235 On Etsy, in contrast, 87% of sellers are female.236
Neither of these results is intentional, and at least part of the reason for the
disparity is that women tend to sell less expensive items, and eBay’s fees are
higher than Etsy’s.237
To what degree should such gender disparities matter? The answer
depends on whether they are the product of restricted access to platforms that
offer important advantages; at that point, the practices go from merely
expressing different preferences to being intrinsically offensive. To the extent
existing studies, for example, indicate that women are more likely than men
to produce the crafts typically sold on Etsy, that in itself is not offensive. And
to the extent that male sellers prefer the auction format on eBay, that too does
not trigger automatic disapproval. If, however, customer bias or
harassment—or lack of access to legitimate sources of high-quality jewelry
or watches—restricts women’s ability to sell on eBay, that ought to be a
subject of concern.
The difficult issue is determining the threshold that triggers increased
scrutiny. Disparate impact law creates a presumption of discrimination when
gender or other disparities exceed 80%.238 If that criterion were applied to
platform world, Etsy and Uber, but not eBay, would be suspect. In light of
the relatively early stage of platform world development, this Article does
not suggest adoption of a standard equivalent to disparate impact; that is, a

235. Kricheli-Katz & Regev, supra note 118, at 2.
236. Andrea Durkin, Etsy’s Growth Illustrates That Even Local Is Global, HINRICH
FOUNDATION: TRADE VISTAS (Feb. 23, 2018), https://tradevistas.csis.org/etsys-growth-illustrateseven-local-global/ [https://perma.cc/SU3Y-THY5].
237. Emily Belcher, Etsy vs. eBay for Reselling: How to Choose, WORK HOME WOMAN,
https://www.theworkathomewoman.com/etsy-ebay-reselling/ [https://perma.cc/2HW8-WVNL]
(last visited Dec. 23, 2018) (noting eBay’s higher fees but greater opportunity for higher prices).
238. EEOC Information on Impact Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2018) (“[S]election rate for
any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for
the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact.”); see Kevin Tobia, Disparate Statistics, 126 YALE L.J. 2382, 2399
(2017)
(discussing
the
flexible
application
of
the
standard);
see
also
Timothy M. Snyder, You’re Fired! A Case for Agency Moderation of Machine Data in the
Employment Context, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 263 (2016) (discussing the standard and
noting that “[t]he White House, EEOC, and FTC have indicated that big data within the
employment context will become a growing priority for the Federal government”).
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standard that creates a presumption of discrimination in effect.239 Instead, it
suggests that when a platform produces a result in which fewer than 20% of
its participants as either buyers or sellers are women, this triggers a
requirement to generate sufficient data to explain why the disparities exist
and whether the practices that produce them involve appropriate practices.
Platform creators should be seen as having an obligation to ensure that their
platforms do not become vehicles for increasing societal inequality.
3.

Considering Tradeoffs

When the mandated reports show gender disparities that do not rise to the
level of triggering automatic scrutiny, the factors that produce them should
nonetheless be subject to some review. In many cases, this scrutiny need not
turn on the issue of gender at all. On Uber, for example, while the gender
disparity among its drivers is substantial, the gender disparity is in pay is
small—Uber women make 93% of the income of Uber men.240 Nonetheless,
the question should arise whether the factor that contributes to this
disparity—driving faster—is desirable. If it is associated with a higher
accident rate, it clearly is not; if it simply rewards drivers who drive
consistently and safely at the speed limit rather than at a slower rate, it should
not be a source of concern. Nonetheless, the creation of a new platform should
involve an obligation to determine the existence of gender disparities, and
where they exist, to inquire about the causes. If the cause is associated with
an inappropriate activity, such as driving faster than the speed limit, Uber
should have an obligation to address it. After all, Uber designed the incentives
that reward faster driving; it should be responsible for the consequences of
those incentives.
This obligation, however, may not necessarily come from the fact of the
gender disparities themselves, which as we have noted are relatively small.
Instead, it should come from the increased risk Uber encourages its drivers to
take. In this case, the problem arises from the presumed lack of tort liability
in the platform context.241

239. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
240. Kirsten Korosec, Pay Disparity Between Men and Women Even Exists in the Gig
Economy, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 2018) http://fortune.com/2018/02/06/uber-gender-pay-gap-study/
[https://perma.cc/Q9RP-XHJK].
241. Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49 CONN.
L. REV. 171, 174–75 (2016) (addressing the limitations of current tort doctrines and the prospects
for them to reach tortious behavior in the sharing economy).
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If on the other hand, there are no safety factors that arise from faster
driving in this context,242 then Uber should simply have an obligation to be
transparent in its pricing mechanisms allowing individual drivers to reach
their own tradeoffs.
Some tradeoffs involve issues of safety or working conditions that may
disproportionately affect women. Women, for example, have historically
been reluctant to work as taxi drivers because of the safety concerns
associated with picking up strangers. Ride sharing platforms have attempted
to address safety concerns by rating customers and having payment take place
offsite so that their drivers do not have to carry cash. To the extent that gender
disparities involve safety concerns, however, that disproportionately affect
women, should platform creators have an obligation to respond?
The answer should be yes where it does not place too great a burden. For
example, ride sharing platforms could allow drivers to screen passengers for
safety issues. In addition, platforms should have an obligation to provide
protection from cyberbullying. Platforms like eBay have made it easier for
sellers to disguise important aspects of their identity such as gender, and in
many circumstances this will be appropriate. Where any employer or
platform creator becomes aware that gender identity can lead to harassment,
and where it is possible to disguise gender identity,243 the platforms should
have an obligation to consider protections for platform participants, including
providing information about the harassment risks and designing adjustments
that provide more protection.
B. Labor Market Redesign
Simply insuring women equal access to platform world, however, is likely
to be meaningless if all that happens is that the greater inclusion of women
increases labor supply in ways that drive down earnings for everyone.
Instead, oversight of platform world will eventually require rethinking the
relationship between individual responsibility and community support. The
missing piece therefore in the discussion of gender in the platform world is
the role of the state in meeting the information age’s needs for fairness.
242. See, e.g., Gig Economy Pressures Make Drivers ‘More Likely to Crash,’ BUS.
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.businesstelegraph.co.uk/gig-economy-pressuresmake-drivers-more-likely-to-crash/ [https://perma.cc/GH7Y-SUXB] (“Research from University
College London (UCL) indicated 42% of ‘gig-economy’ couriers and taxi drivers reported vehicle
damage because of a collision. Close to half admitted time pressure could make them break the
speed limit.”).
243. Such techniques of gender-blindness exist in the employment setting. See, e.g.,
Schoenbaum, supra note 109, at 32.
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Without a more robust state effort to define and enforce fairness in the new
age, the result is likely to be even greater gender disparities. Yet the state
effort must be calibrated carefully.244
Concern should be devoted to where collective action is needed. Current
law, for example, which requires employers to contribute to Social Security,
imposes collective responsibility through higher labor and consumer prices
for retirement security. Federal and state governments have acted through
employers to insure the availability of a host of government benefits
including subsidized health insurance,245 pension benefits, and in some cases
paid family leave.246 Today, platform creators enjoy a competitive advantage
over traditional employers in their ability to shift costs back on their workers.
Regulatory choices going forward must consider the uneven playing field
between types of activities and the security of workers’ interests more
generally.
Platform world is likely to expand as even more of our lives are lived and
managed through online programs. Traditional employers, for example, may
wish to use platform type apps to turn more of their workers into independent
contractors, or temporary or contingent workers.247 In addition, many workers
would like the flexibility to be able to schedule working hours in ways that
avoid the strictures of a forty-hour work week. The same type of apps that
today create platforms for income-generating opportunities outside of
traditional companies could be used to supply workers for an expanding
range of activities within companies. The line between employees,
independent contractors, and temporary and part-time workers could be
further blurred. The significance of these developments for workers generally
and women, in particular, depends less on specific provisions addressing
gender equality and more on labor market conditions. These issues include:
Labor market policies. The combination of mechanization, globalization
and neoliberal economic policies has contributed to slack labor markets with
little pressure to increase wages. Platform world contributes to that as it takes
244. Mayer-Schönberger & Ramge counsel against seeking to “eliminate human biases
regardless of what an individual desires” with a single centralized system that would nudge people
in the same direction. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 41, at 178.
245. Carbone & Levit, supra note 37, at 1020–25.
246. EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER AND WORKER
EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2017), http://paidfamilyleave.org/
pdf/leaves_that_pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/69R7-F2MH] (describing California legislation and
policies).
247. Andrew Karpie, New Study Dissects Organizations’ Ongoing and Future Use of
Contingent Workforce, SPEND MATTERS (May 12, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://spendmatters.com/
2017/05/12/new-study-dissects-organizations-ongoing-future-use-contingent-workforce/
[https://perma.cc/L683-Z5XE] (indicating that 90% of companies already use contingent workers
to some degree and over half are planning to expand their use of such workers).

51:0001]

DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN?

63

advantage of the availability of unemployed or underemployed workers who
would like to earn additional income. Workers with family responsibilities
may be at a particular disadvantage because of their lack of other
opportunities. Labor market policies that contributed to a full employment
economy would increase the price of labor generally, increasing prices on
platform world without more direct regulation.
Health care and pension benefits. The growth of a contingent labor
market, both within and outside platform world, makes reliance on
employment for the delivery of these important benefits untenable. The
largest tax subsidy in the federal budget goes to employer-provided health
insurance, which means that platform workers do not enjoy access to one of
the biggest federal subsidies. Creating universal access to health insurance
would particularly benefit single mothers, and make it easier for more
workers to participate in the platform economy.
Universal preschool and child care subsidies. Platform world, by
making it easier for those with children to generate income, may nonetheless
encourage the marginalization of those with family responsibilities. Indeed,
the risk will be that more primary caretakers turn to platform world rather
than full-time employment to generate income, lessening the pressure on
traditional employers to adopt more family friendly practices. A
comprehensive approach to family needs that includes universal free early
childhood education and greater availability to subsidized, high quality child
care might lessen the marginalization of those who seek income generating
opportunities in platform world as the only option that accommodates
caretaking responsibilities.
Education and training. Platform world depends on the existence of
workers with needed skills, but unlike traditional employment, makes no
provision for training. Moreover, with changes in demand for particular
activities, platform workers bear the entire cost of income volatility,248 and
the potential need to update skills or transfer them to new types of activities.
Greater opportunities for retraining or returning to school, perhaps through
community colleges, might give workers greater flexibility and resilience.
Unemployment compensation. Piecework brings with it additional risks
shouldered by workers: money management, career training, and seeking
recompense for jobs performed—all of which bring additional costs, unpaid

248. Paychecks, Paydays, and the Online Platform Economy: Big Data on Income Volatility,
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Feb. 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/
institute/report-paychecks-paydays-and-the-online-platform-economy.htm
[https://perma.cc/N67B-97JZ].
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labor costs, and risks.249 Platform world places these burdens entirely on the
individual. And, indeed, the very idea of unemployment compensation has
little place in platform world. Accordingly, some form of minimum income
should be considered to provide any hope of greater individual and family
security.250
In short, the complications raised by employment insecurity, ranging from
lack of economic self-sufficiency to health care to retirement, cannot be
resolved by looking to antidiscrimination law. Nonetheless, by revealing
structural problems in the architecture of the platform world, an examination
of gender disparities provides the basis for fundamental changes in
regulation.251 That regulation will ultimately need to address the question of
whether the future lies with the more contingent nature of platform
transactions or whether the economy will need to recreate the more
permanent institutions of earlier ages.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The platform world is truly the Wild West when it comes to the lack of
laws and norms. It is an unregulated landscape. The bits of regulation that are
starting to develop are focused on specific, narrow segments of the platform,
and legal approaches to gender disparities provide a similarly piecemeal, only
partial approach.
Reliance solely on norms or market discipline will, as has been shown,
result in some minor changes.252 But the companies themselves have every
impulse to simply expand their reach of customers and their price points and
no impulse to self-regulate; and the technologies keep improving what they
do, meaning new laws have to be flexible as well. Automating information

249. Ruth Berins Collier, V.B. Dubal & Christopher Carter, Labor Platforms and Gig Work:
The Failure to Regulate 5 (Inst. Res. Labor & Emp’t., Working Paper No. 106-17, 2017),
http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Labor-Platforms-and-Gig-Work.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4MW-S32K].
250. See ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME WOULD
END POVERTY, REVOLUTIONIZE WORK, AND REMAKE THE WORLD 5 (2018); ALISSA QUART,
SQUEEZED: WHY OUR FAMILIES CAN’T AFFORD AMERICA 225–48 (2018); see also Rosalind
Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369,
375 (2018) (noting that “many constitutional democracies . . . are actively considering, and
passing, measures to increase investments in education and training, raise the minimum wage,
guarantee a universal basic income”).
251. See Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
309, 312 (2016).
252. See generally Lessig, supra note 11 (discussing the limits and benefits of the various
legal and nonlegal approaches).
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should not mean disavowing responsibility for building in disparities.253 The
pace and source of innovation further complicates oversight. The furthest
reaching innovations tend to emerge from start-ups that experience intense
pressure to grow overnight or shut their doors.254 Large companies, like
Amazon or Facebook, which often purchase the most successful innovations,
enjoy greater insulation from market pressures and (as Facebook discovered)
greater susceptibility to public outcries. But the public (and sometimes even
the companies themselves) may not become aware of disparities or abuses
until they have been deeply embedded in the operation of a platform. Even
then, the challenges of regulating AI technologies that keep changing and
improving means that future regulation must be potentially infinitely
adaptable as well.255
Silicon Valley entrepreneurs celebrate the incorporation of design
principles into the infrastructure of innovation. They advocate testing,
adjustment, and iteration in the creation of new programs. They increasingly
incorporate artificial intelligence to assist in these adjustments. In the process,
they make conscious decisions about factors such as whether the personal
assistant on iPhones (Siri or Alexa but not Bob or George) should have a male
or a female voice, and they base these decisions on the reactions of their
targeted audiences. As these companies acquire the power to create these
infrastructures, and as they celebrate the process of empathy, observation,
testing, adaptation, and iteration, they should also acquire a greater obligation
to consider whether the programs they design enshrine discrimination in the
processes they create. After all, if Apple is busy spending enormous sums in
judging whether consumers like Alexa better than Bob, it should have an
obligation to ensure that real-life women are not losing out to their male
colleagues because of the name the company instructs women to put on the
bottom of their emails.
On the other hand, sensationalist headlines that shout out that women are
losing in the gig economy merit much more nuanced examination to find out
the source of those disparities.256 Where it is men driving faster or having
253. SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM 148 (2018).
254. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1061–63. Companies resist course corrections that
threaten the perception of success, leaving little room for self-regulation.
255. Jonathan Kay, How Do You Regulate a Self-Improving Algorithm?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 25,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/algorithms-future-of-healthcare/543825/ [https://perma.cc/B3TW-56JK].
256. Lydia Depillis, Even in the Gig Economy, Women Earn Less than Men, KSAT12 (July
5, 2018, 5:53 AM), https://www.ksat.com/money/even-in-the-gig-economy-women-earn-lessthan-men [https://perma.cc/2AQL-XMY9]. This CNN Money article highlights findings from a
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worked on a particular platform for longer, the proposed regulatory response
is not necessarily to sue the platform for pay discrimination but to enforce
speeding laws, to hold the company liable in tort, and to ensure that women
receive benefits for parental responsibilities. Or, where there is sexual
harassment and discrimination at the parent companies, then shareholder
derivative actions provide an additional form of monitoring and potential
remedies.257
Indeed, as tech companies design new, self-contained platforms that
restructure employment, shopping, our virtual and real worlds, there are
critical questions about their obligations to test their designs and adjust them
so that they do not create or perpetuate gender and other forms of inequality.
As we enter the fourth industrial revolution, the merging of digital and human
lives,258 existing antidiscrimination laws and constitutional doctrines remain
relevant, but they do not address a significant portion of the disparities in the
platform world. The platform world replicates the norms and patterns of
gender disparities in the bricks-and-mortar world. Yet many of these
disparities are not actionable under conventional doctrines and show instead
the need to think just how this new world should develop.259
Because the current body of doctrinal law is cramped and limited with
respect to platform world, in this Article, we have discussed a framework to
shift the thinking, to create a new set of ethics for regulating platform world.
We suggest that moving forward requires acknowledging that not all
disparities are, or should be, actionable. On the other hand, developers must
be attentive to how their algorithms and business practices create gender
disparities. Accordingly, the law must confront the trade-offs in
counteracting bias. Equal treatment may conflict with equal opportunity,
recent study by Stanford University and the University of Chicago that found a 7% hourly
earnings gap between male and female drivers on Uber. Id. Nearly half of this gap is attributed to
men driving faster than women, enabling them to complete more rides. Id. Researchers also
attribute the gap to longer use of the app, awareness of productivity tips, and driving in the most
lucrative areas (which are often high crime). Id.
257. See, e.g., Martin v. Page, No. 19CIV00164 (Super. Ct. Cal.) (filed Jan. 10, 2019); Cyrus
Farivar, Alphabet Board Sued over Massive Payout to Android Creator, Among Others,
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 11, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/alphabet-boardsued-over-massive-payout-to-android-creator-among-others/ [https://perma.cc/5GXK-YE4N].
258. See Elizabeth Schulze, Everything You Need to Know About the Fourth Industrial
Revolution, CNBC (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/16/fourth-industrialrevolution-explained-davos-2019.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20190117101420/https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/01/16/fourth-industrial-revolution-explained-davos-2019.html].
259. See also Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 526
(2018) (“[S]ome algorithmic discrimination may be challenged as disparate treatment using Title
VII's stereotype theory of liability.”); Pauline Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online
Employment Recruiting, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (suggesting that while existing
doctrine covers the most “egregious practices,” their additional scope is less clear).
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efficiency may conflict with regulation. A new framework considers the
competing benefits and drawbacks of various approaches as it provides
advice on how to counter bias. Our approach also recommends strengthening
research.
Ultimately, we argue that gender disparities show the need for a
fundamental rethinking of how to protect workers in this new world.260 This
goes beyond merely adapting conventional employment discrimination and
public accommodations laws and focuses on whether workers have adequate
health care, protection against fraud, family leave benefits, and retirement
security. The gender disparities that we have identified point directly to other,
more systemic difficulties with the very idea of platform world—the absence
of responsibility for the provision of basic necessities. Some of these
necessities have been funneled to certain classes of individuals through jobs.
The upheaval of the traditional view of employment ultimately raises
questions about the reinvention of the state.
As the legal system faces the challenges of our new data-driven world,
there is an opportunity to ensure that bricks-and-mortar gender disparities are
not replicated, much less magnified. The source of this opportunity, and the
justification for developing new legal obligations, is not traditional
antidiscrimination law, however. It instead involves ensuring responsibility
for what might otherwise be a tragedy of the commons, that is, what happens
in a shared-resource system when individual users take actions based solely
on their own self-interest and behave contrary to the common good of all
users by spoiling that resource.261 In other words, the new platform companies
focus solely on profit, evade existing regulations designed to protect
employees through the structure of their businesses, and rely on collective
resources—government funding, family resources accumulated by other
family members (in couples, one person may have employer-provided health
care that the other accesses), even internet access—in a way that depletes
those resources.
The argument should not be whether the disparities are the product of
intentional discrimination in the same sense as Title VII. Instead, the question
is whether those who disrupt traditional practices and create new ones for
their own benefit assume responsibility for what they produce. We argue that
the answer is yes—in accordance with the arguments made in this Article.
Those who produce “discrimination by design,” whether that design involves
260. See Warren, supra note 37 (“[P]olicy—rules and regulations— . . . will determine
whether workers have a meaningful opportunity to share in that new wealth.”).
261. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GA2HDGE].
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deliberately creating algorithms that target by gender, or looking the other
way as gender disparities arise by accent, are responsible for the products of
their creations and have an obligation to document them, evaluate them, and
address them, albeit with remedies outside of antidiscrimination law.
Addressing them will not be easy, there may be unintended consequences,262
but a commitment to regulation that ensures products and designs that don’t
reflect existing biases, even when that affects the bottom line, requires a
changed approach.
Having combed through the evidence with respect to the gender disparities
that other scholars find in platform world, we conclude that much of it is not
discrimination in the traditional sense of exclusion, or even bias, in hiring or
promotion. While there are recognizable forms of employment
discrimination within the companies, while women may disguise their names
to be gender-neutral and receive lower ratings, the reasons are not traceable
to bias at the core of contemporary antidiscrimination law. They instead result
from the lack of regulation, the lack of safety protections, and social norms.
Nonetheless, even though the evidence does not always support findings of
traditional forms of sex discrimination—and also shows that platform world
can give women more equality than bricks-and-mortar world—it points to the
larger problems in regulating a new economy and protecting workers.

262. For example, if task-selling or ride-sharing companies allow screening, this may make
women feel more comfortable —but might also result in discrimination against some groups.

